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at Davis; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles; Recipient, Member of the New 
York bar since 1970. 
The 1991 article on New York Civil Practice is dedicated to Evans V. Brewster in 
honor of his seventeen years of outstanding service as the Surrogate of Westchester 
County. 
Judge Brewster is a former member of the White Plains Common Council and the 
Westchester County Board of Supervisors. He also is a past president of the Westchester 
County Bar Association and was a distinguished family court and county court judge 
prior to his election as Surrogate in 1973. Judge Brewster has earned the respect and 
affection of the bench and bar of New York. He has also received kudos for his illustri- 
ous service as president of the National College of Probate Judges and for his contribu- 
tions as a faculty advisor to the National Judicial College. 
Judge Brewster has been a long-standing supporter of Pace University and its Law 
School. He has been a frequent lecturer at many of the law school's continuing legal 
education programs and has been a steadfast VIP at most of our receptions for important 
dignitaries. Judge Brewster's excellence on the bench, coupled with his modesty and 
quiet strength, have earned him the deep respect and friendship of students, faculty, 
deans and alumni of Pace University. 
Now that he has returned to private practice as counsel to a distinguished White 
Plains law firm, we wish him happiness and success. We will continue to rely on his 
indispensable advice and wise counsel. A d  Multos Anos Surrogate Brewster. 
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During the Suwey year, the New York Court of Appeals issued 
important opinions with respect to strict compliance for service of 
process,l the foreign object exception under CPLR 214-a,2 and disclo- 
sure against corporate employees.3 The Court also imposed sanctions 
for the first time under Part 130 of the Uniform  rule^,^ and ruled that 
issue preclusion could be given to a criminal conviction to preclude 
subsequent civil litigation.5 In addition the Court recognized that 
substituted service could be used against a criminal ~ontemnor.~ New 
York appellate courts issued instructive decisions regarding long-arm 
jurisdiction,' forum non conveniens,8 and discovery of surveillance 
1. See infra notes 237-248 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 301-317 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 489-498 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 419-431 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 383-401 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 275-294 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 184-187 and 
accompanying text. 
8. See infa notes 197-21 1 and accompanying text. 
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videos.9 The Legislature also enacted amendments that affect General 
Municipal Law 205(e),lO preferences," Article 78,12 traverse hear- 
ings,13 court-annexed arbitration,l4 defaultsy15 health care proxies,l6 
and forfeiture.17 The Governor also signed legislation affecting no- 
tices of claim and statutes of limitation in wrongful death actions 
against a variety of public authorities.18 
There were also several important federal decisions and federal 
legislation of which the New York bench and bar should be aware. 
The United States Supreme Court issued opinions pertaining to per- 
sonall9 and subject matter jurisdi~tion.~~ The Court also made impor- 
tant rulings with respect to venuey21 res judicata,22 discovery,23 and 
Rule 11 ~anctions.2~ The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
adopted a uniform federal statute of limitations for private securities 
claims25 and clarified use of the sixty day service toll in federal 
courts.26 The court also analyzed what constitutes "doing business" 
9. See infra notes 499-501 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
11. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3403(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 
N.Y. CPLR] (gives trial preference to plaintiffwho is terminally ill when the illness arise 
out of the wrong for which the action is commenced). 
12. See N.Y. CPLR 7804(g) @lcKinney Supp. 1991) (Article 78 proceedings that 
relate to the substantial evidence question must be transferred to the appellate division; 
the 1990 amendment explicitly directs the supreme court to dispose of only those objec- 
tions that could terminate the proceeding). 
13. See UNIFORM RULES OF THE COURT 208.29 (McKinney 1990) (requiring any 
process server testifying at a traverse hearing to bring all records pertaining to service to 
the courthouse with his license if the server is licensed). 
14. See N.Y. CPLR 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (permitting the rules on court- 
annexed arbitration to raise the ceiling from $6,000 to $10,000 in the New York City 
Civil Court). 
15. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
16. See Act of July 22, 1990, ch. 725, 1990 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1539 
( d i e d  at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 29-c (McKinney Supp. 1991)). The Act will be 
effective on January 18, 1991 and relates to designation of agents to make health care 
decisions for individuals who are incapable of making those decisions. 
17. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 90-142 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 63-65, 524-528 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 364-369 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 486-488 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 432-438 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 346-355 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 328-333 and accompanying text. 
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under CPLR 301.27 Finally, on December 1, 1990, President Bush 
signed into law the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.28 The Act 
implements recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Commit- 
tee and changes practice in federal court in a number of important 
areaS29 
There were also important developments regarding mandatory 
continuing legal education3O and mandatory pro bono.31 
Space limitations prevent inclusion of an appendix summarizing 
all CPLR legislation enacted during the Survey year. The practitioner 
should review the table of contents for the various CPLR publica- 
ti0ns.3~ The most important statutory development is the Federal Ju- 
dicial Improvements Act of 1990.33 Prior to discussing the Act, the 
bench and bar should be alerted to several changes in various New 
York State statutes. 
A. New York General Municipal Law 
Last year's Survey commented on Chapter 346 of the Laws of 
1989 which gave a special cause of action in favor of police officers 
injured in the line of d ~ t y . 3 ~  We stated that the new provision should 
be applied retroactively. The law became effective on July 12, 1989, 
and courts immediately began to differ as to whether it was retroac- 
tive. At least three lower courts held the statute to be remedial and 
thus retroactive.35 On the other hand, the Appellate Divisions for the 
27. See infm notes 152-159 and accompanying text. 
28. See infm notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
29. See id. 
30. See infm notes 461-470 and accompanying text. 
31. See infm notes 471-478 and accompanying text. 
32. The complete text should be available for review in the 1990 CPLR publications 
by Matthew Bender, Gould Publications or West's McKinney Commentaries. Copies of 
the entire legislative texts may be obtained by contacting the Department of Governmen- 
tal Relations. The practitioner should also consider subscrib'ig to the Annual Legislative 
Bulletin of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The Bulletin analyzes the 
merits of the proposed bills and discusses their impact on current laws. It is an excellent 
research tool and will keep the practitioner abreast of developments in Albany well in 
advance of the Survey's publication. 
33. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, effective December 1, 1990. 
34. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey of N. Y. Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 63, 
66-67 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1989 Survey]. 
35. See Brez v. McMellon, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1990, at 27, col. 4; Starkey v. Tran- 
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First and Fourth Departments held the statute was not retroactive.36 
Both appellate divisions seemed to concede that the statute was reme- 
dial but stated there was no clear legislative intent to warrant retroac- 
tive appli~ation.~~ On July 26, 1990, Governor Cuomo signed new 
legislation38 which clarities the ambiguity in the previous amendment 
and creates a window of opportunity to sue until June 30, 1991 for 
those actions which were dismissed on or after January 1, 1987 be- 
cause the section was not effective. The "window" also applies to 
claims that would have been actionable subsequent to January 1, 1987 
had the section been effective. A state court of claims has held that 
the new reversal law may be unconstitutional.39 
B. Wrongful Death Actions 
Chapter 804 of the Laws of 1990,40 effective August 25, 1990, 
provides for a uniform two year statute of limitations for wrongful 
death actions against all authorities. The new legislation also pro- 
vides for a uniform one year plus 90 day limitation for those public 
authorities which have no existing statute of limitations pertaining to 
causes of actions for personal injury. The law also incorporates the 
time limits of section 50-e of the General Municipal Law for service of 
notices of claim against public authorities.41 
camp Contracting Corp., 152 A.D.2d 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2d Dep't 1989). See also 
Carlucci, The Firemen's Rule and its Application to Police Oflcels, 17 WESTCHESTER B. 
J. 33 (Winter 1990). 
36. See Ruotolo v. State, 157 A.D.2d 452, 549 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1990); 
Guadagno v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 155 A.D.2d 981, 548 N.Y.S.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1989). 
37. See Ruotolo, 157 A.D.2d at 453, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 23; Guadagno, 155 A.D.2d at 
981, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 967. 
38. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 5 205-e (McKinney Supp. 1991). 
39. See Spencer, OBcers Again Fail to Win in State Claim, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, 
at 1, col. 6 (discussing decision by Court of Claims Judge Benza in Santangelo v. New 
York, Claim No. 81400 and Kilschenheiter v. New York, Claim No. 81401 to not apply 
the revival statute to their claims because a final judgment dismissing them had previ- 
ously been entered). 
40. See Act of July 25, 1990, ch. 804, 1990 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1607 
(codified at N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW 5 2981 (McKinney Supp. 1991)). This bill is a signif- 
icant step toward bringing a degree of uniformity to the numerous and unpredictable 
short statutes of limitations against public authorities and corporations. 
41. See Bauman, New Bill Affects Wmngful Death Actions, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, 
at 2, col. 6 ("The bid does not go so far towards uniformity as to change all existing 
statutes of limitations for commencement of suit in actions for personal injuries to a 
uniform one year plus 90 days now contained in General Municipal Law 504, and 
Public Authorities Law 5 1212 (2)(4)."). 
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C Court of Claims Procedure 
Section 11 of the Court of Claims Act relates to filing, service 
and contents of claim, and notice of intention, and sets out the man- 
ner of service of a claim or notice of intention, to file a claim.42 Sec- 
tion 10 sets forth the time requirements.43 Chapter 625 of the Laws of 
199044 amends section 11 so that objections to noncompliance with 
requirements for time or manner of service are waived unless raised 
with particularity, either by a motion to dismiss made before service 
of the responsive pleading is required, or in the responsive pleading.45 
The amendment should diminish prior uncertainty and eliminate the 
possibility of unfair surprise.& 
D. Default Judgment 
Chapter 419 of the Laws of 1990 amends CPLR 3215 by adding 
a new paragraph 4 to subdivision (f).47 This addition provides that 
when a default judgment is sought on the grounds of non-appearance 
against a domestic or authorized foreign corporation, an &davit shall 
be submitted that an additional service of summons by first class mail 
has been made upon the defendant corporation at its last known ad- 
dress at least twenty days before the entry of judgment.48 The re- 
quirement is not applicable to cases in the small claims part or 
commercial claims part of any court, or to any summary proceedings 
to recover possession of real property, or to actions affecting title to 
real property.49 
42. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 8 11 (McKinney 1989). 
43. See id. $ 10. 
44. See Act of July 18, 1990, ch. 625, 1990 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1322 
( d i e d  at N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 5 11 (McKinney Supp. 1991)). 
45. See id. The new bill regularizes and clarifies the time constraints of Section 10 
and the personal and certified mail service requirements of Section 11. 
46. Prior to the enactment of the bid there was some confusion as to whether the 
service requirements of Section 11 related to subject matter or personal jurisdiction. 
Some judges had held that Section 11 requirements related to personal jurisdiction, which 
meant they were waivable, while other judges applied the Court of Appeals decision in 
Finnerty v. New York State Thruway Auth., 75 N.Y.2d 721, 550 N.E.2d 441, 551 
N.Y.S.2d 188 (1989), to require that they be viewed as issues of subject matter jurisdic- 
tion and not waivable. 
47. See Act of July 10, 1990, ch. 419, 1990 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 995 
( d i e d  at N.Y. CPLR 3215(f)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1991)). 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
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E. CPLR 217 
Chapter 457 of the Laws of 199050 extends the four month stat- 
ute of limitations to actions complaining about conduct that would 
constitute a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. It is ap- 
plicable to any action or proceeding against an employee organization 
subject to article fourteen of the civil service law or article twenty of 
the labor law, which complains that the employee organization has 
breached its duty of fair representation to someone to whom the or- 
ganization has a duty. The statute requires that these actions shall be 
commenced within four months of the date the employee or former 
employee knew or should have known of the breach.51 
E Forfeiture Laws 
Chapter 655 of the Laws of 1990,52 effective November 1, 1990, 
enacts a sweeping revision of the state's forfeiture laws. The law incor- 
porates the provisional remedies of CPLR 13-A, which permit pre- 
judgment seizure of a defendant's assets without the explicit require- 
ment of a due process probable cause hearing.53 Nonetheless, a due 
process hearing may be required, at least prior to the seizure of real 
property.54 
G. Additional Items 
The practitioner may also wish to become familiar with new 
amendments relating to jury tria1,55 small claims court actions56 and 
50. See Act of July 10, 1990, ch. 467,1990 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1087 
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney Supp. 1991)). 
5 1. See id. 
52. See Act of July 18,1990, ch. 655,1990 MCKUWEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1358 
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 13 1 1 (McKinney Supp. 1991)). 
53. See id. 
54. See United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Live 
nia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that a due process hearing was necessary prior to the seizure of real property. 
55. See N.Y. CPLR 4102 (McKinney Supp. 1990). Subsection (a) of CPLR 4102 
had been construed by the courts to hold that a party who filed a note of issue without a 
jury demand was unable to object when another party filed a jury demand but later deter- 
mined to withdraw it. The new amendment to subsection (a) requires the other party to 
obtain consent of the filer of the note of issue prior to withdrawing the demand. Thus, 
the amendment overrules prior contrary case law. Id 
56. See N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT 5 1801-A (McKinney Supp. 1991) (raises the mon- 
etary jurisdiction of commercial small claims parts in the civil, district and city courts 
from $1,500 to the maximum amount permitted in small claims court, currently $2,000). 
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income execution.57 
H. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 
This Act was passed by Congress in the midst of its final late 
night budget reconciliation session of October 27-28, 1990.58 The Act 
is an omnibus statute which consists of eight separate titles. Each title 
is referred to by name as a separate "Act." 
Title I is the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. It provides for an 
expanded process to reduce delay in civil litigation in the federal 
courts. Title I1 is the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990. It authorizes 11 
new circuit judgeships and 74 new district judgeships, and gives per- 
manent status to some existing judgeships that were previously only 
temporary. Title I11 is the Federal Courts Study Committee Imple- 
mentation Act of 1990. It includes important changes to the law of 
supplemental jurisdiction, removal, venue and appellate jurisdiction. 
It also introduces changes to the limitations period applicable to 
claims and actions when supplemental jurisdiction has been invoked 
and to the limitations period for civil actions arising under newly en- 
acted federal statutes. Title IV is the Judicial Discipline and Removal 
Reform Act of 1990. It makes changes in the procedure for the inves- 
tigation of complaints of judicial misconduct. Title IV also creates a 
national commission to review issues involving the tenure of Article 
I11 federal judges, including discipline and removal. The remaining 
four titles do not relate to the operation of federal courts. They are: 
Title V (Television Program Improvement Act of 1990); Title VI (The 
Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990); Title VII (Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act); and Title VIII (Computer Software 
Rental Amendments Act of 1990). 
Title I11 of the Act is particularly important to the New York 
practitioner. Section 310 adds new section 1367 to Title 28 of the 
United States Code.59 Section 1367, effective only as to civil actions 
which are commenced on or after December 1, 1990, creates supple- 
mental jurisdiction. This jurisdiction includes pendent claim and an- 
cillary jurisdiction and specifically repudiates Finley v. United States60 
57. See N.Y. CPLR 5231 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (income from all sources, and not 
just earnings, is subject to the ten percent income levy). 
58. See Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). See also Giuffra, The Judicial Im- 
provements Act of 1990, 204 N.Y.L.J. 122, Dec. 26, 1990, at 1, col 1. 
59. See Pub. L. 101-650, 5 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 51 13-14 (1990). 
60. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (on an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States 
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by authorizing pendent party jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction 
is prohibited over persons made parties or seeking to become parties 
under Civil Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 when exercising jurisdiction over 
such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional require- 
ments of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. section 1332.61 Section 
3 1162 amends 28 U.S.C. section 1391 relating to venue in federal civil 
actions. The provision for venue based on the residence of the plain- 
tiff is repealed. Under the former rule, venue was established in a 
judicial district in which the defendant or all defendants reside and in 
a district in which a substantial part of the claim arose. As a result of 
the amendment, venue in federal question actions is broadened be- 
yond the defendant's residence and the place where a substantial part 
of the claim arose to include a new provision pertaining to "venue by 
necessity." This permits venue in a judicial district where any defend- 
ant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may other- 
wise be brought.63 
Title I11 also affects removal jurisdiction. Section 312 amends 28 
U.S.C. 1441(c) to limit the predicate separate and independent claim 
to one that is within the federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. 
section 133 1.64 Thus if removal is effected under newly amended sec- 
tion 1441(c), the district court has discretion to remand only matters 
in which state law predominates.65 Title I11 also affects statute of lim- 
itations. Section 313 enacts a general four year statute of limitations 
respecting civil actions arising under Acts of Congress that do not 
specifically set forth a period of limitati0ns.6~ This provision applies 
only to causes of action arising under legislation which Congress en- 
acts after December 1, 1990. Title 111 also relates to rules governing 
finality under 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Congress currently authorizes 
appeal as of right from all final decisions of the district courts under 
28 U.S.C. section 1291. Section 3 15 amends the Rules Enabling Act 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to allow a San Diego woman whose family died 
in a 1983 airplane crash to sue the federal government, San Diego, and a utility company 
in one federal lawsuit). 
61. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (Supp. 1990) (providing for diversity subject matter juris- 
diction between citizens of different states if the amount in controversy is at least 
$50,000). 
62. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1391 (Supp. 1990). 
63. See Pub. L. 101-650, $311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990). 
64. See id. $ 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990). 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 8 313,104 Stat. 5089,5114-15 (1990). The federal law does not incorpo- 
rate applicable state tolls and extensions. 
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to permit the Supreme Court to determine by rule instead of case law 
the terms and conditions under which district court decisions will be 
considered final and appealable under section 1291." 
There are three important opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that affect subject matter jurisdiction.68 In addition, the newly en- 
acted Judicial Improvements Act of 199W9 repudiates the Supreme 
Court's recent holding in Finley.70 
In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,71 the Supreme Court held that 
the citizenship of all partners in a limited partnership, rather than 
citizenship of general partners alone or the state where the partner- 
ship is created, governs determinations of whether diversity of citizen- 
ship exists for federal jurisdictional purposes.72 The Carden decision 
was recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Curley v. Brignoli.73 
In Port Authority v. Feeney,74 the Supreme Court resolved a con- 
flict between the Second and Third Circuits by ruling that the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey was not immune, as a state 
agency under the eleventh amendment, from suits in federal c0urt.7~ 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court affirmed a decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit which permitted two personal injury 
suits by Port Authority employees to be filed in Manhattan federal 
67. See id. 8 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 51 15 (1990). 
68. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990); TaWin v. Levitt, 493 
U.S. 455 (1990); Port Authority v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990). 
69. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
70. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). See Pub. L. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089,5113-14 (1990). 
71. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). 
72. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1021. 
73. 915 F.2d 81 (2d Ci. 1990) (Second Circuit noted that Carden answered in the 
affirmative the question whether, in a suit brought by a limited partnership, the citizen- 
ship of the limited partners must be taken into account to determine diversity of citizen- 
ship among the parties). 
74. 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990). 
75. Id. at 1873-74. 
76. Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of five, stated that the New York and 
New Jersey Legislatures had agreed, when they created the bi-state agency in 1921, to 
waive any immunity to federal lawsuits that the states may enjoy. Thus, she held that the 
eleventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects states from federal law- 
suits, was not applicable to the Port Authority. Four justices stated that they would go 
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Last year's Survey77 promised to track Taflin v. Levitt.78 The 
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that state courts have jurisdic- 
tion to hear civil lawsuits brought under the Federal Racketeer Influ- 
enced and Corrupt Organizations A ~ t . ~ 9  We also analyzed Finley,80 
where the Supreme Court purported to bury pendant party jurisdic- 
tion.sl During the Survey year, New York federal judges applied Fin- 
ley differently.82 In Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Spartan Mechanical,83 
Judge Bartels concluded that, in light of the Finley decision, the dis- 
trict court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the third 
party claims for contribution or indemnification, since they lacked an 
independent jurisdictional basis and were not within ancillary juris- 
diction of the ~our t .8~ In Huberman v. Duane Fellows,85 Judge Lei- 
sure held that the Finley doctrine was not applicable to a third party 
defendant.86 On December 1, 1990 President Bush signed into law 
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.87 Section 310 of Title I11 of 
the Act adds a new section 1367 to Title 28 of the U.S. Code. This 
section applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990 
and specifically authorizes pendent party jurisdiction. It impliedly re- 
pudiates Finley.88 
further and permit the Port Authority to be sued in federal court even if the states had 
not consented. 
77. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 85. 
78. 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990). 
79. In 1988 the New York Court of Appeals held in Shnpson Elm. Corp. v. Leu- 
cadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 530 N.E.2d 860, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1988), that New York 
State courts shared subject matter jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil claims 
brought under RICO. See Carlisle, N. Y. Civil Practice, 1988 Survey of N. Y. Law, 40 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 77, 95 (1989) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1988 Survey]. 
80. 109 S. Ct. 2003. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 85. 
81. Finley involved an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Pendent jurisdic- 
tion was sought against the municipal and utility defendants on state claims. The United 
States Supreme Court had previously rejected pendent jurisdiction in Aldinger v. How- 
ard, 427 U.S. l (1976) but left open the issue of whether pendent party jurisdiction could 
exist if a federal claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal court. In Finley, 
the Court held that absent an independent base for subject matter jurisdiction against one 
of several defendants, dual litigation will be required. 
82. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Spartan Mechanical Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990); Huberman v. Duane Fellows Inc., 725 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
83. 738 F. Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
84. Aetna, 738 F. Supp. at 664. 
85. 725 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
86. Hubeman, 725 F. Supp. at 204. 
87. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
88. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1367 (1991). 
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IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Constitutional Limitations on In Personam Jurisdiction 
Prior Surveys have discussed some of the relevant constitutional 
considerations necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction in New 
York.89 During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court 
analyzed these considerations in Burnham v. Superior Court of Cali- 
fornia.90 Burnham merits discussion because of its approach to the 
doctrine of minimum c0ntacts.9~ It also serves as another example of 
how a defendant personally served or tagged in New York is subject 
to the in personam jurisdiction of our c0urts.9~ 
The Burnham facts are simple. Dennis Burnham married 
Francie Burnham in 1976. In 1977 they moved to New Jersey where 
two children were born. In July of 1987 the Burnhams separated. 
Mrs. Burnham moved to California with custody of the two children. 
The Burnhams agreed that she would file for divorce on grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. Nonetheless, in October of 1987, Dennis 
filed for divorce in New Jersey on the grounds of desertion but failed 
to make service of process upon Francie. In January of 1988, Francie 
filed for divorce in California but did not make service on Dennis. 
Thereafter, Dennis traveled to California on business and visited his 
children in the San Francisco area where Francie resided. Dennis 
took one child away for a weekend trip and upon return to Francie's 
home, was served with a summons and copy of the divorce action. 
Dennis returned to New Jersey and later in the year made a special 
appearance in the California superior court to challenge the court's in 
personam juri~diction.9~ 
The California courts found that Dennis was subject to jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorarig5 and found that 
89. See Carlisle, A! Y. Civil Practice, 1987 Survey of A! I: Law, 39 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 75, 88-98 (1988) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1987 Survey] (analyzing the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Asahi v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987). See also Carli.de, A! Y. Civil Practice, 1986 Survey of A! Y. Law, 38 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 67, 85-88 (1987) [hereinafter Civil Practice, 1986 Survey] (analyzing the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
90. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990). 
91. See infra notes 84-134 and accompanying text. 
92. See J. WEINSIZIN, H .  KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 
$301.10 [hereinafter WEINSTEIN, KORN & MLLER]. 
93. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109 (1990). 
94. Id. 
95. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989). 
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jurisdiction existed; however the Court adopted different views of 
when presence constitutes a jurisdictional predicate.96 First, the plu- 
rality focused on an historical evidence and consensus or common law 
historical pedigree approach. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explained in Parts I, 11-A, B, C, D97 and I11 that 
transient presence alone was sufficient for a jurisdictional base. Sec- 
ond, Justice White, who joined the plurality in all respects except for 
Parts 11-D and I11 of the opinion, concurred in the judgment. He 
explained that in limited circumstances the Court could find that 
presence alone was not sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.98 Third, 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor concurred in 
the judgment but found that presence alone was not enough for an 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction.99 They concluded that it was 
necessary to conduct an independent due process inquiry.lm Fourth, 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and explained that he 
could join neither Justice Scalia's nor Justice Brennan's opinion in the 
case.lol Justice Stevens stated that the historical evidence and consen- 
sus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified 
by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice 
White, all combined to demonstrate that the case was an easy one.lo2 
Justice Stevens also observed that "[plerhaps the adage about hard 
cases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases."lo3 
I .  Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Kennedy, concluded that the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment does not deny a state court's jurisdiction over 
a nonresident who was personally served with process while tempo- 
rarily in that state when the suit is unrelated to his activities in the 
state. lo4 
(a) The plurality explained that in determining whether the as- 
sertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process, the 
96. Id. at 2116-17, 2119-20, 2126. 
97. Id. at 2109-19. 
98. Id. at 21 19-20. 
99. Id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
100. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120-21. 
101. Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (plurality opinion). 
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Supreme Court has long relied on the principles traditionally followed 
by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each 
state's authority. The plurality admitted that the classic expression of 
that criterion appeared in International Shoe v. Washington,los which 
held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction must not 
violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."l06 
Nonetheless, the plurality explained that the International Shoe hold- 
ing was not intended to be applicable to cases where jurisdiction was 
based on presence.107 
(b) In Part 11-B, the plurality explained that a formidable body of 
precedent, beginning with common-law antecedents and extending 
through decisions at or near the time of the fourteenth amendment's 
adoption, reflected the almost unanimous view that service of process 
confers state-court jurisdiction over a nonresident who is physically 
present, regardless of whether he was only in the state on a transient 
basis or whether the cause of action is related to his activities there.108 
(c) In Part 11-C, the plurality rejected the petitioner's challenge 
to the old rule that presence alone is sufficient as a jurisdictional pred- 
icate.109 In this respect, petitioner had argued that in Shafler v. Heit- 
ner the Court had adopted sweeping language which held that all 
assertions of jurisdiction must be pursuant to the minimum contacts 
standard of International Shoe.111 The plurality explained that the 
International Shoe standard was developed by analogy to the tradi- 
tional physical presence requirement. The new standard served as a 
means of evaluating novel state procedures for assertion of in per- 
sonam jurisdiction over absent defendants.112 The plurality noted 
that these novel procedures were developed primarily with respect to 
state long-am statutes whereby a nonresident defendant could be 
subjected to judgment only as to matters that arise out of or relate to 
his contacts with the forum state.1l3 The plurality held that nothing 
in the International Shoe case or its progeny supported the proposi- 
105. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
106. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
107. Burnham, 110 S .  Ct. at 2115. 
108. Id. at 2110-13. 
109. Id. at 2113. 
110. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
1 1  1. Burnham, 110 S .  Ct. at 21 13 (discussing International Shoe v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945)). 
112. Id. at 21 14-15. 
113. Id. 
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tion that a defendant's presence in the forum state is itself not a suffi- 
cient jurisdictional predicate. l4 
2. Parts II-D and III 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, concluded that Shafler 115 must be strictly limited to its 
facts and that Justice Brennan's proposal to apply an independent due 
process inquiry constituted a break with the International Shoe 
standard.116 
(a) Justice Scalia explained that when read in context, Shafer's 
statement that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evalu- 
ated according to the [International Shoe] standards,"ll7 was intended 
only to apply to quasi in rem jurisdiction. Justice Scalia admitted that 
the Shafler holding was applicable to other forms of in personam ju- 
risdiction over nonresident defendants, but not to defendants who 
were present in the forum when served.118 
(b) Justice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's proposal for use 
of an independent due process inquiry for all state assertions of juris- 
diction was nothing more than a totality of the circumstances test 
which would lead to uncertainty and to unnecessary litigation over 
the preliminary issue of the court's competence.l19 Justice Scalia ex- 
plained that each justice would be required to exercise his or her sub- 
jective discretion as to what is fair and just. This would lead to a 
misuse of judicial resources and result in inconsistent decisions.120 
3. Concurring Opinion of Justice m i t e  
Justice White joined Part I and Parts 11-A, 11-B and 11-C of the 
plurality's opinion. He explained that the rule permitting an assertion 
of in personam jurisdiction on the grounds of presence alone is so 
widely accepted that he could not possibly strike it down, either on its 
face or as applied to the Burnham facts, on the ground that it denied 
due process of law. Justice White went on to note that the Court does 
have power under the fourteenth amendment to examine even tradi- 
114. Id. at 2115. 
115. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
116. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 21 17. 
117. Id. at 2116. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 21 19. 
120. Id. at 2117. 
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tionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid.121 He recog- 
nized the sweeping language of Shafler '22 but argued that it would be 
applicable only if a forum's jurisdictional rule was so arbitrary and 
lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held 
violative of due process in every ~ a s e . 1 ~ ~  Justice White noted that un- 
til such a showing is made, claims that the rule would operate unfairly 
as applied to a certain nonresident need not be heard.124 If the de- 
fendant's presence in the forum is intentional, that is enough for Jus- 
tice White. His common sense approach was based on a desire to 
avoid endless, fact-specific litigation in the trial and appellate 
courts. 125 
4. Concurring Opinion of Justice Brennan 
Justices Breman, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Comor concurred 
in the judgment but argued that presence alone does not automati- 
cally comport with due process simply by virtue of its pedigree. Jus- 
tice Brennan agreed that history is an important factor in establishing 
whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements, but 
posited that an independent inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing 
in-state service rule must be undertaken.126 
Justice Breman noted that the transient jurisdiction rule will 
generally satisfy due process requirements because the rule is consis- 
tent with reasonable expectations and is entitled to a strong presump- 
tion that it comports with the fourteenth amendment.127 Since 
Dennis Burnham availed himself of significant benefits provided by 
the forum state, it was foreseeable that he could expect to litigate 
there. Justice Breman also pointed to a variety of procedural devices 
that could ameliorate any burdens that might arise.1z8 Finally, Justice 
Brennan argued that the Scalia approach was foreclosed by the 
Court's holdings in International Shoe and Shafler.129 
121. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (White, J., concurring). 
122. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
123. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring). 
124. Id. at 2120. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
127. See id. at 2124. 
128. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125. 
129. See id. at 2120. 
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5. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens explained that he did not join the Court's opinion 
in Shafler 130 because he was concerned by its unnecessarily broad 
reach. He explained that the same concern prevented him from join- 
ing the Scalia or Brennan approach in Bumham. He criticized Justice 
Scalia's suggestion that when and if a jurisdictional rule becomes sub- 
stantively unfair or even unconscionable, the Court has no power to 
alter it.131 Justice Stevens also questioned Justice Scalia's reliance on 
individual states to limit or abandon bases of jurisdiction that have 
become obsolete.132 Justice Stevens explained that states have little 
incentive to limit rules such as transient j~risdiction.13~ Finally, Jus- 
tice Stevens noted that the reasoning of Justice Scalia's opinion was 
strikingly oblivious to the raison d'etre of various constitutional doc- 
trines designed to protect out-of-staters, such as the Art. IV Privileges 
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause.134 
6. Eflect of Burnham's Constitutional Consideration in New York 
It has been long recognized in New York that any person served 
with a summons while physically present in the state is subject to suit 
in New York on any claim.135 Although this aging doctrine has been 
questioned by some C O U ~ ~ S , ~ ~ ~  there is no New York decision which 
has held to the contrary. If a nonresident defendant is tagged with 
process, even if the action is unrelated to his temporary presence in 
New York, our courts will have in personam jurisdiction.137 This rule 
has two exceptions. A person is not deemed present in the state for 
130. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
131. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
132. ShafTer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
133. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218-19. 
134. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. N, 5 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, 9 8, cl. 2. 
135. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MLLER, supra note 92, at 5 301.10. 
136. Some courts have concluded that transient jurisdiction did not survive Shaffer 
v. Heitner. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 
1985); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088-91 @. Kan. 1978), 
rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. 
Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-14 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bershaw v. 
Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985). See also Ehrenzweig, The 
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The '%werW Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 
YALE L.J. 289, 293-303 (1965). 
137. See Alumina1 Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Opert v. Schmidt, 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud,138 
and he is immune from process when he is voluntarily in the state to 
attend a civil or criminal litigation whether as plaintiff, defendant or 
witness.139 Also, the rule is subject to the discretionary power of the 
courts under CPLR 327140 to decline jurisdiction.141 It remains to be 
seen if New York courts will reject transient presence when the facts 
of a given case show unfairness, involuntariness, inconvenience or 
similar circumstance.. It is highly likely that New York courts will 
apply the forum non conveniens doctrine to minimize unfairness. In 
this respect, New York courts are generally unwilling to dismiss cases 
under CPLR 327(a) when the plaintiff is a New York resident.142 
B. Bases or Exercise of Jurisdiction 
I. CPLR 301: General Jurisdiction143 
The traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction that devel- 
oped prior to the adoption of the CPLR were incorporated into it by 
CPLR 301.144 Thus, personal jurisdiction based on physical pres- 
ence,l4Uomicile,l46 consent,14' or "doing business"l48 permits New 
York courts to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of 
action irrespective of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts 
138. See generally WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, CPLR MANUAL 5 304[a] (1986 
ed.) [hereinafter CPLR WAL]. 
139. Id. 
140. See N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney 1990). 
141. Even if a New York court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, CPLR 
327(a) gives the court discretionary power to dismiss the case. Under CPLR 327(b), 
however, dismissal is highly unlikely if the action arises out of a contract agreement or 
undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the General Obligations Law applies if the parties 
have agreed that New York law will govern. 
142. See infra notes 201-21 1 and accompanying text. 
143. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1990). 
144. See id 
145. Two exceptions should be noted: a person is not deemed present in New York 
for purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud, and he has irnmu- 
nity from process when he appears voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend pro- 
ceedings involving criminal or civil litigation. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying 
text. 
146. See N.Y. CPLR 313 (McKinney 1990) (New York domiciliary subject to in 
personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever it arises, and regardless of where the de- 
fendant is located at the time the summons is served). 
147. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1990). 
148. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 
(1917). 
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with New York.149 
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain juris- 
diction over a foreign corporation."o Although the Court of Appeals 
has stated "[tlhe test for doing business is and should be a simple 
pragmatic one . . . ,"Is1 a review of the cases decided during the Sur- 
vey year indicates that the test, while pragmatic, is far from simple. 
Three cases are worthy of comment. 
Within a one week period, both the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals agreed that in- 
surance underwriters at Lloyd's of London were not "doing business" 
in the state and could not be sued here, despite their substantial inter- 
est in a trust fund maintained in a New York bank for the purpose of 
paying American ~1airns . l~~ A decision to the contrary would have 
meant that any multinational company that had a banking relation- 
ship with New York could have been found to be doing business here. 
The circuit court listed the many contacts appellants had with New 
Yorkl53 but noted that since the cause of action did not arise out of 
any of them, CPLR 301 was the only possible jurisdictional predi- 
cate.lS4 The circuit court explained that in assessing general jurisdic- 
tion in New York, courts have generally focused on the existence of 
an office in New York; the solicitation of business in New York; the 
presence of bank accounts or other property in New York; and the 
presence of employees or agents in New Y ~ r k . " ~  The circuit court 
noted that solicitation of business alone did not justify a finding of 
corporate presence in New York.lS6 Appellants argued that under the 
solicitation-plus theory157 there was general jurisdiction. They 
claimed that the defendants' employees' trips to the United States to 
service existing accounts and solicit new ones constituted substantial 
149. See Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305,310,434 N.E.2d 692,695,449 N.Y.S.2d 
456, 458 (1982). 
150. See Laufer at 310, 434 N.E.2d at 695, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 458. 
151. See Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29. Cf: 
cases collected and discussed in WEINSITIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 92, at 
301.16. 
152. See Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander; Alexander & Alexander Sews., 
Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 565 N.E.2d 488, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1990) and Landoil Resources 
Corp. v. Alexander; Alexander & Alexander Sews., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1990). 




157. Landoil, 918 F.2d at 1044. 
Heinonline - -  42 Syracuse L. Rev. 362 1991 
19911 Civil Practice 363 
solicitation and that the following factors met the "plus" portion of 
the test: the placement of New York insurance risks in London; the 
placement of foreign insurance risks in New York and the circum- 
stance that some of the defendants received substantial revenue from 
their New York transactions.158 The circuit court held that the solici- 
tation-plus rule was not a talismanic test for jurisdiction, but instead 
was merely a means by which courts have attempted to resolve that 
issue.159 The court concluded that the district court did not err in 
finding that the record did not establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence a sufficient predicate of jurisdiction under CPLR 301. The 
New York Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Landoil Re- 
sources v. Alexander & Alexander,l60 which came to the Court as a 
certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- 
cuit. Our highest state court unanimously ruled that the under- 
writer's indirect interest in the trust fund at Citibank was insufficient 
to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 30 1 .I61 Both Landoil decisions 
demonstrate that New York State and Federal courts must analyze a 
defendant's connections to the forum state "not for the sake of con- 
tact-counting, but rather for whether such contacts show a continu- 
ous, permanent and substantial activity in New York."l62 
In Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines,l63 one key issue before the dis- 
trict court was whether the P.L.O., which is not recognized as a state 
by the U.S. government, was "doing business in New York."l64 Judge 
Stanton noted that not only does the P.L.O. own a building in New 
York City in which its permanent representative and his family live, 
but there also were eight other employees residing in the building.165 
Judge Stanton also pointed out that the P.L.O. owned an automobile 
and maintained a bank account in New York and was listed in the 
telephone book.'" Similarly, the judge observed that the P.L.O.'s 
permanent representative engaged the media to publicize P.L.O. poli- 
cies and spoke wherever he could obtain an invitation.167 Judge Stan- 
-~ ~~ - - 
158. Id 
159. Id. at 1044. 
160. Landoil, 77 N.Y.2d at 31, 565 N.E.2d at 489, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (1990). 
161. Id. at 35, 565 N.E.2d at 491, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 742. 
162. See generally CPLR MANUAL, supra note 138, at 3 304(d). 
163. 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
164. Chasser, 739 F. Supp. at 863. 
165. Id. at 857. 
166. Id. 
167. Kliighoffer v. S.N.C. Achiie Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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ton held that the aggregate of these activities constituted doing 
business under CPLR 30 1. 
2. Long Arm Jurisdiction 
CPLR 302168 permits New York courts to assert jurisdiction over 
nondomiciliary individuals and foreign corporations169 that are not 
subject to CPLR 301, but instead have the state contacts listed in sec- 
tion 302.170 This b'long-arm" jurisdiction is limited by the terms of 
CPLR 302 and by federal and state constitutional considerations to 
claims that arise from the defendant's activity related to New York.171 
A review of the personal jurisdiction cases decided during the 
Survey year172 supports the observation that "long-arm inquiries can 
leave the realm of the merely monotonous and become intensely mo- 
notonous."l73 Of the many cases interpreting CPLR 302, the follow- 
ing are worthy of brief mention. 
a. CPLR 302(a)(l) 
' Subsection (a) of CPLR 302 specifically excludes from its reach 
the tort of defamation. That exclusion is contained in both CPLR 
302(2) and (a)(3) covering torts committed both within and outside of 
New York. In Vardinoyannis v. Encylopedia Britanni~a,"~ Judge 
Leval held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants 
transacted business in New York by mailing allegedly defamatory let- 
ters. Judge Leval pointed out that while the contacts were business- 
168. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1991). 
169. See Sionson v. Int'l Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 288, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431, 251 
N.Y.S.2d 433,438 (1964) ("[allthough the section does not in terms refer to corporations, 
its application to foreign corporations, as well as to nonresident individuals, seems 
clear.") 
170. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1990). 
171. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadiac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 
408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (standing for the proposition that the New York Constitution has 
a due process clause which the Court of Appeals has held may require more than its 
federal counterpart); see also Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking Co. 54 N.Y.2d 
865, 429 N.E.2d 411, 444 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1981). 
172. See Firegreen Ltd. v. Claxton, 160 A.D.2d 409, 553 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1st Dep't 
1990); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Isoreg, 154 A.D.2d 859, 546 N.Y.S.2d 720 (3d Dep't 1990); 
Leiderman Assoc. v. Robotool Ltd., 154 A.D.2d 515, 546 N.Y.S.2d 137 (2d Dep't 1990); 
Genicom v. Ekco Group, 160 A.D.2d 551,554 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1st Dep't 1990); Murdock 
v. Arenson Int'l U.S.A., 157 A.D.2d 110, 554 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1st Dep't 1990); Don King 
v. Buster Douglas, 735 E Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
173. Siegel, The Afliction Known as Long Arm Jurisdiction, 199 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1988). 
174. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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related, they were neither purposeful nor designed to avail the defend- 
ant of the forum's protections.175 He also commented that he had 
"considerable doubt" whether CPLR 302(1) applied in defamation 
~ases.17~ Judge Leval stressed that since subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) 
of the statute specifically exclude actions for defamation, there are 
strong arguments that the legislature intended to bar use of the long- 
arm statute in defamation cases. He reasoned that since the purpose 
of the exceptions in CPLR 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) was to avoid unneces- 
sary inhibitions on freedom of speech or the press, an extension of 
subsection (a)(l) seemed to nullify the protection of 
nondomiciliaries.177 
There are few cases in New York applying the "contracts any- 
where" provision of CPLR 302(a)(1).178 In Melendez v. Professional 
Machine & the question was whether a New York court 
could assert jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturing company which 
was neither registered to do business nor doing business in the state, 
and which did not solicit or have an office telephone or sales represen- 
tative here. The only contact the defendant had was that it shipped 
its product into New York.180 The supreme court found that in addi- 
tion to shipping its product into New York, the defendant had entered 
into the contract here and performed it for several years for a New 
York company.181 The supreme court did not address an unsettled 
area of the law to determine whether a mere contract to ship goods 
FOB to the nondomiciliary seller's place of business provides suf6- 
cient minimum ~ontacts.18~ 
Once there has been a single contact or contacts between the 
nondomiciliary defendant and New York, there must be a showing 
that the cause of action is directly related to and arises from the con- 




178. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1990); see also Paradise Prods. Corp. v. 
Allmark Equip. Co., Inc., 138 A.D.2d 470, 526 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1988) (analyzing 
the "contracts anywhere" clause of CPLR 302 in terms of due process requirements re- 
quired to confer jurisdiction over nondomiciliary who contracts outside of New York to 
provide goods or services to New York). 




183. See generally WEINSTEIN, KORN & MLLER, supra note 92, at $5 301-16. 
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Department analyzed this requirement with respect to CPLR 
302(a)(1)-(3). Pursuant to section 302(a)(l) the appellate division 
held that the record was devoid of any evidence that defendant's al- 
leged activities in New York gave rise to the causes of action for 
which long-am jurisdiction was sought.185 With respect to 302(a)(2), 
the Appellate Division held that the record did not support a finding 
that the appellant committed a tortious act within New York.186 The 
appellate division also held that the requirements of 302(a)(3) had not 
been satisfied, the fact that plaintiff was domiciled in New York and 
suffered a loss of income here did not constitute an injury within the 
state. 
b. CPLR 302(a)(3) 
A prior edition of the Survey analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court's 
holding in Asahi v. Superior Court of California.188 We also discussed 
the question of what guidance the Asahi.opinion provides for the New 
York bar.189 During the Survey year, one distinguished state supreme 
court judge applied some of the Asahi standards to determine if a non- 
resident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in New 
York.190 In Beyer v. Pearl Desk,191 Justice Baer held that the Asahi 
standards, relating to the "stream of commerce" minimum contacts 
test, were dispositive on the issue of jurisdiction. The court dismissed 
the action against the manufacturer but found disclosure was neces- 
sary to determine if the Asahi fairness test was met by the supplier, 
who had a licensing rather than formal distribution arrangement.lg2 
Justice Baer's approach reminds the practitioner of the importance of 
184. 165 A.D.2d 241, 556 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1990). 
185. Storch, 162 A.D.2d at 241, 556 N.Y.2d at 343. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 242, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 343. 
188. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 89, at 88-97 (1988). 
189. Id. at 95-98. 
190. See Beyer v. Pearl Desk Co., 204 N.Y.L.J.28 (1990) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1990). 
191. Id. (parties did not raise considerations with respect to Part 11-B of the Asahi 
opinion, which garnered support of all the United States Supreme Court justices with the 
exception of Scalia). 
192. Jurisdictional disclosure is available under N.Y. CPLR 321 1 (d) (McKinney 
1970). See generally WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 92, at 4 301.07, n.39 
(citing Peterson v. Spartan Indus., Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 467, 310 N.E.2d 4513, 515, 354 
N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1974) (proposition that the Court of Appeals favors jurisdictional 
discovery)). The bench and bar should note the different standards for disclosure in state 
and federal practice. In state courts, a good faith conclusory allegation of jurisdiction 
presents a "sufficient start" to entitle the plaintif to disclosure on jurisdictional issues. In 
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developing a detailed record for purposes of preventing a dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds.193 CPLR 321 1(d) provides for jurisdictional 
discl0sure.19~ In this respect, it is important to note the different stan- 
dards for disclosure in state and federal practice. In state courts, 
good faith conclusory allegations of jurisdiction present a "suEicient 
start" to entitle the plaintiff to disclosure on jurisdictional issues.195 
In federal courts, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction in order to proceed with discovery.196 
C Forum Non Conveniens 
Even if a New York state or federal court has subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction, CPLR 327(a) gives the state court trial judges 
discretionary power to dismiss the case.l9' Federal district court 
judges have similar discretion. Unlike state practice, the availability 
of an alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite for applying the 
doctrine to dismiss a complaint in federal court.198 Also, in state 
practice CPLR 327(b) prohibits dismissal where the action arises out 
of a contract agreement or undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the 
General Obligations Law applies.199 
I. CPLR 327(a)2w 
The two most important opinions applying CPLR 327(a) are 
federal courts, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction in order to 
proceed with discovery. 
193. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 89, at 97-98 (analysis of 
importance of developing record). 
194. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(d) (McKinney 1990). This section, entitled "Facts un- 
available to opposing party" provides that: 
Should it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion made 
under subdivision (a) or (b) that facts essential to justify opposition may exist 
but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving 
party to assert the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a 
continuance to permit further affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had 
and may make such other order as may be just. 
See also Sedig v. Okemo Mountain, 204 N.Y.L.J. 27 (1990) (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1990) 
(advertising by Vermont ski resort warranted discovery as to jurisdiction). 
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
196. Id. 
197. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985). 
198. Islamic Republic, 62 N.Y.2d at 474, 467 N.E.2d at 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
199. See N.Y. CPLR 327@) (McKinney 1990). 
200. See N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney 1990). 
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Highgate Pictures v. DePaul201 and Avnet v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety.202 In Highgate the trial court granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding the action had little 
connection with New York.203 The contract was largely negotiated in 
California.204 It was also executed in California and governed by Cal- 
ifornia law.205 In addition, the alleged breaches and torts occurred in 
London and India.206 The appellate division reversed the trial court 
basing its decision not to apply forum non conveniens on two grounds. 
First, it found that the trial court abused its discretion in not condi- 
tioning the grant of the motion on the availability of an alternative 
forum.207 Second, the appellate division placed great emphasis on the 
defendant's onerous burden when the plaintiff is a New York resident. 
The First Department stated, "A New York resident plaintiff will not 
be deprived of its home forum unless it plainly appears that New 
York is an inconvenient forum and that another is available which 
will best serve the ends of justice and the convenience of the par- 
ties.' "208 In Avnet, the First Department affirmed the dismissal of 
plaintiff's complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. The plaintiff 
had sued on incidents occurring at out-of-state waste sites. The appel- 
late division stated that the issuance of insurance policies were issued 
was b;t one factor to be considered and did not automatically make 
New York the most convenient forum.2@' Thus, if the plaintiff is a 
New York resident it appears that New York courts will be unlikely 
to grant a dismissal under CPLR 327(a) unless the cause of action is 
absolutely unrelated to our state.210 Also the onerous burden of proof 
is on the moving party.211 
2. Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Court 
In Borden v. Meiji Milk Products,212 the Court of Appeals for the 
201. 153 A.D.2d 126, 549 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1st Dep't 1990). 
202. 160 A.D.2d 463, 554 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't 1990). 




207. Highgate, 153 A.D.2d at 128, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 387. 
208. Id. at 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (citations omitted). 
209. Avnet, 160 A.D.2d at 464, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36. 
210. See id. at 464, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 135. 
211. See Highgate, 153 A.D.2d at 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 388. 
212. 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cu. 1990). 
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Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that the simple uniform 
standard of Gulf Oil v. Gilbert 213 permits reversal of a forum non con- 
veniens determination only when there has been a very clear abuse of 
discretion by the district The circuit court held that the Gulf 
standard, which relates to the district court's consideration of the pri- 
vate interests of the litigant and the factors of public interest, places 
heavy reliance on the discretion of the district court in balancing the 
Gulf f a~ to r s .~ l~  The circuit court also rejected appellant's argument 
that the district court erred because appellees failed to meet at the 
outset their burden of showing the availability of an adequate remedy 
in J a ~ a n . ~ ' ~  The Second Circuit stated that it does not matter 
whether the district court considers the availability of an adequate 
remedy elsewhere at the beginning, the middle, or the end of its writ- 
ten 0pinion.~17 
3. Choice of Forum 
In Banco de Commercio e Industria de Sao Paulo SA. v. Esusa 
Engenharia e Construcoes SA.,218 a Brazilian bank, afier loaning 
money to a Brazilian construction company which later went bank- 
rupt, sued the individual Brazilians who guaranteed the corporate ob- 
ligations. The loan agreement provided that actions could be 
instituted in New York.219 Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. The supreme court denied the motion, holding that Gen. 
Oblig. Law section 5-1402220 permitted a New York action for any 
transaction involving more than $1 million, since the nonresidents 
had previously agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of a New York 
State or federal court. 
In Royal Touch v. Home Shopping Network,221 the defendants 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on a purchase order 
forum selection clause that gave Florida courts exclusive jurisdiction. 
When defendants faxed the purchase order to the plaintiff to buy jew- 
elry, they neglected to fax the back of the form that contained the 
213. 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). 
214. See Borden, 919 F.2d at 827. 
215. Id at 828. 
216. Id at 828-29. 
217. Id. 
218. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 26, col. 2. 
219. Id. 
220. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW $ 5-1402 (McKinney 1975). 
221. N.Y.L.J., Dec 24, 1990, at 26, col. 4. 
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contract language and the forum selection clau~e.22~ The supreme 
court found no evidence establishing that the parties expressly agreed 
to the forum selection clause.223 The court denied the motion and 
held that since the clause was not faxed, New York was the proper 
f0rum.22~ 
D. Statutory Requirements for Service of Summons 
Prior Survey articles have devoted substantial portions of the ju- 
risdiction section to a recitation of cases showing that New York 
courts require strict compliance with service of summons and notice 
provisions.225 The legislature has enacted CPLR 312-a,226 which pro- 
vides for service of summons by &st class mai1.227 This experimental 
statute, which is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
("FRCP") 4(~)(2)(c)(ll),~~* will probably be permanently enacted 
prior to its expiration date of Jan. 1, 1992. Last year's S~rvey22~ dis- 
cussed the new mailing statute, and we have yet to discover a reported 
case analyzing it. It also appears that many plaintiffs' lawyers are not 
using the new mailing statute.230 Once again we remind the bar that 
service by mail has been extraordinarily successful in federal practice. 
In this respect we call the reader's attention to Datskow v. 
Teledyne,231 wherein the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that Rule 4(f) of the FRCP limits mail service under Rule 4(c) to the 
territorial limits of the state.232 Since the enactment of CPLR 312-a, 
extraterritorial service of process is now available in federal court 




225. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 92-94; Carlisle, Civil 
Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 79, at 101-07; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supm 
note 89, at 11  1-17; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 89, at 93-99. 
226. See N.Y. CPLR 312-a (McKinney 1990); see also McLaughlin, Service by Mail 
in New York, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1. 
227. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I990 Survey, supra note 34, at 89-92, for analysis o f  
the new statute. 
228. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(c)(2)(c)(ii). 
229. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
230. Address by Professor Jay C. Carlisle, Past President's Dinner for the Defense 
Association o f  New York (Nov. 13, 1990) (copy on file at the Syracuse University College 
o f  Law, H. Douglas Barclay Law Library). 
231. 899 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1990). 
232. Datskow, 899 F.2d at 1302. 
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Also, the practioner is admonished not to try service by mail 
if there are six or fewer months remaining on the applicable statute of 
limitations.234 
No Survey on New York Civil Practice would be complete with- 
out reference to some of the significant decisions which demonstrate 
the importance of strictly complying with service stat~tes.~~S We will 
briefly mention a few of these cases and highlight an issue of first 
impression as to whether due process requires personal delivery of 
process to an alleged criminal contemn0r.23~ 
I. Strict Compliance 
The strict compliance case of the year is the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Hick v. Stewart- Warner237 The defendant was a foreign 
corporation not authorized to do business in the State of New York. 
Plaintiff mistakenly believed that the defendant was authorized to do 
business in the State and commenced an action pursuant to Business 
Corporation Law 30623* instead of Business Corporation Law 307,239 
which governs service on unauthorized corporations. Plaintiff "ef- 
fected personal service on the Secretary of State at her office in Al- 
233. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, absent a state ser- 
vice statute authorizing service by mail, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not 
specifically authorize service by mail outside the territorial boundaries of the state 
wherein the district court was located. 
234. Address by Professor Jay C. Carlisle, New York State Trial Lawyers Institute 
CPLR Program (Oct. 20, 1990) (copy of remarks on file at Syracuse Law Review). 
235. See Tropeano v. Astoria Gen. Hosp., N.Y.L.J., May 31, 1990, at 30, col. 3 
(Sup. Ct., Queens Co.) (medical malpractice suit dismissed for improper service of pro- 
cess); Ferenzo v. Haggerty, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 3, 1990, at 26, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 
1990) (use of CPLR 308 expedient service options must be proven impractical> Caputo v. 
Reed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 31, col. 4 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1990) (due diligence 
rules must be met before use of substituted service). See also Squiers, Judge Rules Im- 
proper Service Void Award Against Khashoggi, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1990, at 3, col. 1; 
Barker, Service of Process on Foreign Corporations, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1989, at 3, col. 1; 
Freed C Brandes, Service of Process and Ancillary Relief, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1990, at 3, 
col. 1. 
236. See infm notes 275-294 and accompanying text. 
237. 76 N.Y.2d 50, 555 N.E.2d 907, 556 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1990). 
238. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 306(b) (McKinney 1986) (providing that service 
of process on a foreign corporation authorized to do business in New York is complete 
when process is served upon the secretary of state). 
239. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 307 (McKinney 1986) (providing that service of 
process on foreign corporation unlicensed to do business in New York shall be sufficient if 
notice thereof and a copy of the process are either delivered personally to the foreign 
corporation without the State or sent to it by registered mail). 
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bany and thereafter [the] defendant received a copy of the process at 
its office in Judge Hancock, writing for the Court, posed 
the question as "whether under these circumstances the court ac- 
quired personal jurisdiction over defendant although plaintiff did not 
send a copy of the process to defendant by registered mail as required 
by section 307(b)(2) or file the affidavit of compliance required by sec- 
tion 307(c)(2)."24l The trial court had denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss and found that jurisdiction had been acquired. The appellate 
division had afErmed.242 
Judge Hancock began by stating that "[tlhe question is whether 
the procedures established in Business Corporation Law section 307 
are requirements of a jurisdictional nature which must be strictly sat- 
isfied."243 He distinguished between service on a foreign corporation 
authorized to do business in New York and one not so authorized.244 
With respect to the former, Judge Hancock noted that service of pro- 
cess in the State was simple: "There are no theoretical uncertainties 
concerning the basis for jurisdiction since the foreign corporation is 
concededly doing business in the State and, indeed, has applied for 
authority for the express purpose of doing so . . . . "245 Judge Han- 
cock noted, however, that service of process for unauthorized foreign 
corporations requires much more to assure that the corporation, in 
fact, receives a copy of the process.246 Judge Hancock also observed 
that "[tlhese are not mere procedural technicalities but measures 
designed to satisfy due process requirements of actual notice."247 
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that all of CPLR 307 is jurisdictional 
and implicitly reminded the bench and bar that all state service stat- 
utes are to be strictly constr~ed.2~~ 
Additional strict compliance cases under CPLR 308249 and Vehi- 
240. Flick, 76  N.Y.2d at 53, 555 N.E.2d at 908, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 51 1. 
241. I d  
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 54, 555 N.E.2d at 909, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
244. Id. at 55, 555 N.E.2d at 909, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
245. Flick, 76  N.Y.2d at 57, 555 N.E.2d at 910, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
246. I d  at 56, 555 N.E.2d at 909-10, 556, N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
247. Id. at 56, 555 N.E.2d at 910, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
248. See also Macchia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680,505 N.Y.S.2d 591 
(1986) (Court of Appeals held that there is no reason to extend the clear and unambigu- 
ous meaning of service of process statutes). See generally Barker, supm note 235, at 3, 
col. 1.; Siegel, Some Warning Flags about Serving Unauthorized Foreign Corporations as 
Court of Appeals Construes BCL 307Strictly, 370 N.Y. ST. DIG., Oct. 1990, at 1, col. 1. 
249. See infra notes 251-270. 
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cle and Trafic Law section 253250 should be noted. In Broomes-Si- 
mon v. Klebanow,251 the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department held that substituted service under 308(2)252 "leave and 
mail" was invalid because mailing to the defendant's actual place of 
business failed to comply with statutory requirements that the envel- 
ope containing the papers bear the legend "personal and conliden- 
tial."253 In Dorfman v. Leidner'254 the Court of Appeals held that 
service of process on a member of the defendant physician's office staff 
was not proper, even if the office staff misrepresented its authority to 
accept service of process.255 In Biological Concepts v. Rudel,256 the 
Third Department also held that service of process on defendant's 
mother-in-law was not sufficient to allow the court to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant257 Substituted service under CPLR 
250. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
251. 160 A.D.2d 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2d Dep't 1990). 
252. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1990). 
253. The appellate division pointed out that "not only did the envelopes in which 
the summonses were mailed bear endorsements which arguably violate[d] the statutory 
prohibition against indications that the sender is an attorney or that the communication 
'concerns an action' against the addressee, they [also] failed to bear the legend 'personal 
and confidential' as required by . . . CPLR 308(2)." Broomes-Simon v. Klebanow, 160 
A.D.2d at 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 696. Thus the appellate division held that "[slince the 
plaintiff's process server failed to comply with the conditions prescribed for the mode of 
substituted service utilized, jurisdiction over the respondents was not acquired." Id 
254. 76 N.Y.2d 956, 563 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1990), afirming Davidson v. Community 
Gen Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 748, 551 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't 1990). 
255. Davidson, 158 A.D.2d at 748-49, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Plaints's process 
server averred that he had previously served process on the group of physicians with 
which defendant practiced on at least I5 occasions, and on each occasion he had served a 
member of the office staff based on the fact that the process server had been told that the 
doctors would not come out into the waiting area to accept service, nor would they per- 
mit h i  to enter the rear offices to serve them personally. Plaintiff's process server also 
stated that the office staff had informed h i  that they were authorized to accept service 
on behalf of the doctors. Nonetheless, the appellate division held that service was not 
properly carried out under CPLR 308(1). The appellate division also rejected the plain- 
t s ' s  argument that CPLR 308(2) should be applied retroactively to validate the service. 
256. 159 A.D.2d 32, 34, 558 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (3d Dep't 1990) (service of process 
on defendant's mother-in-law was not sufficient to allow court to obtain personal jurisdic- 
tion over defendant, even though mother-in-law lived in the same apartment building as 
defendant, where server made only one minimal effort to serve defendant prior to leaving 
the legal papers with the mother-in-law in her separate apartment). 
257. Biological Concepts, 159 A.D.2d at 34, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 313. The appellate 
division held that the mother-in-law was a person of suitable age and discretion within 
the contemplation of CPLR 308(2) but that the requirements relating to delivery of the 
summons to a person at the actual dwelliig place or usual abode of the person to be 
served were not met. Id. 
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308(2) requires substituted service to a person at the actual dwelling 
place or usual place of abode of the person to be served.25* Since the 
mother-in-law lived in a different apartment, the service did not 
strictly comply with the statute.259 
Several decisions during the Survey year demonstrate that CPLR 
308(4)260 "nail and mail" is good old unreliable ser~ice.~61 In Van 
Raalte v. Metz,262 the Appellate Division for the Second Department 
held that wedging pleadings in the doorway of defendant's residence 
did not constitute "aflixation" to the door of defendant's residence as 
required by the ~ ta tu te .2~~ Similarly, in Moss v. Convin,264 the Second 
Department held that &davits of service were insufficient because 
there was no evidence that the process servers had made any efforts to 
ascertain defendant's place of employment or to attempt service 
there.265 The Second Department adopted a more flexible approach 
258. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1990). 
259. Biological Concepts, 159 A.D.2d at 34, 558 N.Y.2d at 313. The appellate divi- 
sion noted that had the process server made more persistent efforts, including more visits 
to the defendant's apartment, perhaps the requirements of CPLR 308(2) may have been 
met. Id. 
260. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1990). 
261. See Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service under New York's Nail and Mail Stat- 
ute, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (analyzing service under CPLR 308(4) and con- 
cluding that it is always hazardous, because it requires proof of "due diligence" to make 
service under subsections (1) and (2) of the statute). 
262. 161 A.D.2d 760, 556 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 1990). 
263. 161 A.D.2d at 760,556 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The process server testified at a trav- 
erse hearing that he affixed the pleadings to the door by means of scotch tape. However, 
the defendant's wife testified that she found the pleadings wedged in the doorway between 
the storm door and the door jamb of the front entrance to the residence. This conflicting 
testimony created an issue of credibility which the supreme court determined in favor of 
the defendant. The appellate division held that it is well settled that matters of credibility 
are best determined by the hearing court, whose decision should not be disturbed if s u p  
portable by a fair interpretation of the evidence. Id 
264. 154 A.D.2d 443, 546 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1989). 
265. Moss, 154 A.D.2d at 443, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The process server had on two 
separate occasions afkied a copy of a summons and verified complaint to the door of the 
appellant's residence, and another copy had been mailed to the same address. "The nail 
and mail service in each instance was alleged to have been preceded by three attempts to 
serve the appellant at his home. Of the six attempts at personal service, all were made on 
weekdays during normal working hours, except for one attempt at 9:35 p.m." Id. The 
appellate division held that since there was "no evidence in the moving papers that the 
process servers had made any efforts to ascertain the appellant's place of employment or 
to attempt service there," the affidavits of service were "insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish that the process servers exercised such due diligence as the statute requires to 
permit the use of substituted service under CPLR 308(4)." Id 
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to service under CPLR 308(4) in Lugo v. Santiag0.26~ In Lugo, the 
defendant claimed that he did not reside at a residence where service 
was attempted, but the record indicated that residence was the ad- 
dress he provided to police after the automobile accident that was the 
subject of the action.267 Defendant also had provided the same ad- 
dress to the Department of Motor Vehicles on his driver's license and 
license plate registration forms sometime after service was allegedly 
made. Thus the appellate division held the strict compliance due dili- 
gence requirements of CPLR section 308(4) had been satisfied.268 
In Cummins-Allison v. Bargarnik the Civil Court of the City of 
N.Y. for Kings County held that service of process on an out-of-state 
motorist was insuflicient where the envelope sent to the motorist by 
certified mail return receipt requested was returned with a notation 
"Moved forwarding time expired."269 The court noted that there was 
no ordinary mailing after return of the certified mailing.27O 
2. Non-Resident Witness at Traverse Subject to Jurisdiction 
In a prior Survey, we alerted the bench and bar to a decision of 
the New York City Civil Court which held that valid re-service of 
process on defendants conferred jurisdiction notwithstanding the pen- 
dency of motions alleging defective original service.271 Thus, respon- 
dents were not immune from re-service while in court contesting the 
original servi~e.~7~ During the Survey year, Judge Friedman, in an- 
266. 160 A.D.2d 845, 554 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1990). 
267. Lugo, 160 A.D.2d at 845, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 280. The defendant's sworn state- 
ment was that he did not reside at the Brooklyn address at the time service was at- 
tempted. The appellate division noted that this was the address he provided to the police 
after the accident. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. 146 Misc. 2d 1042, 1043, 553 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1990). 
270. Cummins-Allison, 146 Misc. 2d at 1043-44, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The Civil 
Court noted that the manner of service provided by section 253 "is in derogation of the 
common law." Id. As a result the statute is to be strictly construed. Thus, where the 
certified mailing has been returned with the notation "address unknown" or "address 
moved-no forwarding address" or "returned to sender - forwarding time expired" the 
courts have found that the requirements of section 253 have not been met. Id. But see 
Stefanini v. Hudson, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1990, at 28, col. 5 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1990) 
(service by certified mail satisfies N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 253 if letter is returned 
unclaimed). 
271. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 79, at 117, n. 327 (discuss- 
ing Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d 893, 509 
N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1986)). 
272. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d at 897, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (Housing Judge Lewis , 
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other thoughtful opinion, ruled that a New York State resident who 
does not reside in the City of New York is not immune from service 
while appearing at the civil court for a traverse.273 The defendant, a 
resident of Nassau County, had moved to dismiss the summons and 
complaint on the ground that since he did not reside in the city, he 
was immune from service while appearing at the civil court for a trav- 
erse. The court denied the motion, holding that the defendant was 
not immune from service but subject to long-arm jurisdiction under 
Civil Court Act section 404.274 
3. Substituted Service on Alleged Criminal Contemnor Does Not 
Yiolate Due Process Clause 
In Morfesis v. Department of Housing Preservation and Develop- 
ment,275 the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York was faced with the question of whether the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment required in-hand delivery of pro- 
cess to an alleged criminal con te~nnor .~~~  Morfesis was charged with 
violation of seven separate orders of a New York Civil Court Housing 
Judge to provide heat and hot water to seven apartment buildings in 
Manhattan.277 The Department of Housing Preservation and Devel- 
opment of the City of New York ("I-IPD") served applications for 
criminal contempt on Morfesis pursuant to the leave and mail provi- 
sions of CPLR 308(2) and section 110(m) of the New York City Civil 
R. Friedman held that valid reservice of process on the owners conferred jurisdiction 
notwithstanding the pendency of motions alleging defective original service). 
273. Sekur Alaxm Co. v. Samuels, 205 N.Y.L.J. 95 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1990). 
274. Judge Friedman reasoned that the immunity doctrine is not only applicable to 
a person coming to New York from out of state. The doctrine is a privilege extended as a 
matter of public policy to facilitate the administration of justice and to induce nonresi- 
dents to come into the state to give testimony. Nonetheless, the doctrine is not applied if 
the nonresident would be subject to the state's long-arm statute. Judge Friedman con- 
cluded that this same reasoning applied to a person not normally subject to the jurisdic- 
tion of the civil court but amenable to jurisdiction pursuant to the civil court's long-arm 
jurisdiction, which is provided for in the Civil Court Act section 404. 
275. 733 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
276. A New York State intermediate appellate court had previously mled, in an 
issue of first impression, that leave and mail service was sufficient to commence criminal 
contempt proceedings. See Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equi- 
ties, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 459, 461-62, 524 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326-27 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st 
Dep't 1987). 
277. Dep't of Hous, 137 Misc. 2d at 460,524 N.Y.S. at 325; see also Morfesis, 733 F. 
Supp. at 746. 
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Court A~t.~78 The service was mailed to and left at the address given 
to HPD pursuant to the Housing Maintenance Code,279 which re- 
quires registration by the person responsible for the maintenance of a 
multiple dwelling. Morfesis did not appear at any stage of the con- 
tempt proceedings, but an attorney did appear for him.280 Morfesis 
claimed that prior to his sentencing hearing, there was no indication 
that the attorney was expressly or implicitly authorized to appear on 
his behalf.281 He also argued that the Due Process Clause required 
personal in-hand delivery service of process to commence criminal 
contempt proceedings.282 The Appellate Term for the First Depart- 
ment rejected his claim and held that personal delivery of process is 
not required in special proceedings so long as the party charged is 
notified of the accusation and is afforded a reasonable time to de- 
fend.283 This decision was afErmed by the Appellate Division for the 
First Department,z84 and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal 
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.2s5 Morfesis then filed 
a petition for habeas corpus in federal court.286 
Judge Sand noted that, "while several Supreme Court decisions 
discuss the issue of notice, none directly address [sic] the need for 
personal service of process."287 Judge Sand also found that the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution only requires that a 
criminal contemnor have notice of the charges and an opportunity to 
defend.288 He concluded that leave and mail service provides such 
reasonable notice.289 
- - - -- -- - - - - 
278. See N.Y. C m  CIV. C'f. ACT 5 1 lqm) (McKinney 1990). 
279. Article 41 of the Housing Maintenance Code requires registration by the per- 
son responsible for the maintenance of a multiple dwelling. 
280. Morfesis, 733 F. Supp. at 746. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Dep't of How, 137 Misc. 2d at 459, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 324, 326-27. 
284. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equities, Inc., 150 A.D.2d 
181, 540 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1989). 
285. Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 W. 132 Equities, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 
841, 545 N.E.2d 872, 546 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1989). 
286. Morfais, 733 F. Supp. at 745. 
287. Id. at 746. "When the acts in contempt are not committed in open court, [dlue 
process of law . . . requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a 
reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation.' " Id (quoting 
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925)). 
288. Id. at 747. 
289. Id. See also Landlord is Sent to Jail for not Providing Heat, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
10, 1989, at 29, cal. 1.; Devil Slumlord Behind Bars - At Last, N.Y. Post, Mar. 10, 1990, 
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The Morfesis decision has important policy implications for the 
Civil Court of New York. There are recurring problems with respect 
to service of Orders to Show Cause ("OTSC") for contempt in supple- 
mentary civil proceedings as a result of the failure of a witness as 
judgment debtor to appear on the return date of a subpoena issued 
pursuant to CPLR sections 5223 and 5224.z9O The problem arises 
when a moving party seeks an OTSC for contempt. When the OTSC 
is submitted to the clerk's office at Special Term, Part 2, for signature 
by the judge assigned to the part, the clerks insist that the papers 
contain "service in-hand" instead of "service pursuant to CPLR sec- 
tion 308."29l Case law has held that service by any method pursuant 
to CPLR section 308 is sufficient service and that "in-hand service" 
under CPLR section 308(1) is not required.292 Therefore, the service 
requirement for OTSC civil contempt cases in Civil Court are more 
stringent than those required by statute and the applicable case law.293 
This is particularly true since the OTSC requests are for civil con- 
tempt and are, therefore, clearly subject to a lower due process stan- 
dard. The administrative judges of the New York Civil Court should 
comply with the law of the state of New York.294 
New York courts issued important opinions relating to the con- 
tinuous treatment doctrine,295 the foreign object exception,296 the bor- 
rowing statute,297 the application of CPLR section 203(b)(5) in 
at 4, col. 2. See generally Barker, A Review of the Contempt Process, 202 N.Y.L.J. 121 
(1989) (presenting outline review of the contempt process in New York State). 
290. N.Y. CPLR 5223 - 5224 (McKinney 1990). 
291. Id. 
292. See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text. See also Dep't of Hous. Pres- 
ervation & Dev. of the City of N.Y. v. Arick, 131 Misc. 2d 950, 503 N.Y.S.2d 489 
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1986). 
293. In Arick, Judge Friedman held that the term "personal service" did not require 
"in-hand personal delivery", and that service of an OTSC pursuant to any APLR 308 
method would be sufficient. Id. at -, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 492. See also CPLR MANUAL, 
supra note 138 (standing for proposition that the term "personal service" does not mean 
in-hand delivery of process). 
294. See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text. The issue is what the law 
permits rather than what standards the administrative judges deem appropriate. 
295. See Jorge v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 A.D.2d 650, 563 
N.Y.S.2d 41 1 (1st Dep't 1991). 
296. See Rodriguez v. Manhattan Medical Group, P.C., 77 N.Y.2d 217,567 N.E.2d 
235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1990). 
297. See Singer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 153 A.D.2d 210, 549 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1st Dep't 
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federal and the question of whether an action against hospi- 
tal staff is governed by a three year or two and one half year statute of 
limitations.299 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also 
adopted a uniform federal limitations period for some private securi- 
ties clai~ns.~OO 
A. Foreign Object Exception 
If a foreign object has been left in the patient's body, the statute 
of limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have rea- 
sonably discovered the malpractice.301 If the exception applies, the 
action must be commenced within one year of the actual or imputed 
discovery.302 We have previously pointed out that the Court of Ap- 
peals has narrowly applied the foreign object exception.303 During 
the Survey year the Court refused to extend the exception to the stat- 
ute of limitations in medical malpractice actions to include undetected 
intrauterine devices.304 This decision resolved a conflict between ap- 
pellate decisions in the First and Second Departments.305 
Judge Titone, writing for a unanimous court in Rodriguez v. 
Manhattan Medical Group, I? C ,3M framed the issue as to whether a 
"fixation device" originally implanted in a patient's body for a specific 
treatment purpose is transformed into a "foreign object" within the 
meaning of the foreign object exception when a physician retained to 
remove it negligently fails to do so.307 The Court reviewed Flanagan 
1990), aff'g, Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 146 A.D.2d 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st 
Dep't 1989). 
298. See Datskow, 899 F.2d at 1298. 
299. See Halas v. Parkway Hosp., 158 A.D.2d 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 
1990). 
300. See Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Ci. 1990). 
301. N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990). 
302. Id 
303. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I986 Survey, supra note 89, at 103-04. 
304. See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d 217, 567 N.E.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193. 
305. In Stemberg v. Gardstein, 120 A.D.2d 93, 508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986), 
the Appellate Division for the Second Department held that an IUD became or took on 
the character of a foreign object when the defendant performed an abortion and tubal 
ligation sterilization procedure but negligently failed to remove the IUD. The plaintiff's 
medical malpractice action, therefore, accrued when the IUD was or could reasonably 
have been discovered by the patient. The Appellate Division for the First Department 
took a different position as evidenced by its decision in Rodriguez, 155 A.D.2d 114, 552 
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1st Dep't 1990). 
306. 77 N.Y.2d 217, 567 N.E.2d 235, 566 N.Y.S.2d 193. 
307. Id. at 218-19, 567 N.E.2d at 236, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 194. 
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v. Mount Eden General Hospital308 and its pr~geny,~" and then con- 
cluded that the foreign object exception was very narrow.310 The 
Court also examined the history of CPLR section 214-a and con- 
cluded that the legislature intended to limit a foreign object to one 
that the doctor does not intend to leave inside the body.311 Thus 
Judge Titone held that the IUD did not become a foreign object when 
defendants failed to remove it after having been retained to do ~0.312 
The Court of Appeals also distinguished IUD cases from its earlier 
holding in Flanagan on the following grounds: (1) the IUD claim, 
unlike the claim in Hanagan, clearly rested on defendants' alleged 
negligence in exercising professional diagnostic judgment or discre- 
tion;313 (2) a claim based on injuries arising from a failure to diagnose 
such as that asserted by the IUD plaintiffs involves a far more prob- 
lematic chain of causation than one based on injuries arising from the 
negligent implantation of a surgical instrument or other foreign ob- 
ject;314 and (3) in contrast to the Flanagan case, IUD actions raise 
credibility questions.315 These questions require the fact-finder to as- 
sess conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant-physician's diag- 
nostic methods and conclusions were consistent with contemporary 
professional standards of care.316 
The bottom line is that the Court of Appeals continues its long 
308. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). 
309. See Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 567 N.E.2d at 237, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 195. 
See, e.g., Merced v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 553, 391 N.Y.S.2d 
863, rev'd, 44 N.Y.2d 398,377 N.E.2d 453,406 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1977) (negligently performed 
tubal ligation discovered following emergency surgery for ectopic pregnancy); Matter of 
Smalls v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 55 A.D.2d 537,389 N.Y.S.2d 372, rev'd, 
44 N.Y.2d 398, 377 N.E.2d 453, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1978) (lesion caused by negligently 
performed cervical myelogram); Dobbins v. Cliord, 39 A.D.2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 
(1972) (damage to pancreas during course of operation to remove spleen); Murphy v. St. 
Charles Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1970) (malfunction in surgically im- 
planted prosthetic device). But see Schiffman v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases, 36 A.D.2d 31, 
319 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1971) (declining to apply Flanagan rule to erroneous diagnosis of 
malignancy). 
310. Rodriguez, 77 N.Y.2d at 221-22,567 N.E.2d at 238,566 N.Y.S.2d at 196 ("Our 
continuing commitment to that premise [that Flanagan not be broadened beyond its ex- 
isting confines] has been reiterated on many occasions, and in several different 
contexts."). 
311. Id. at 222, 567 N.E.2d at 238, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 196. 
312. Id. 
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tradition of narrowly applying statutes of limitations and deferring to 
the legislature to correct any wrongs.317 
B. CPLR 214-a: The Continuous Treatment Doctrine 
The applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine requires 
that there be more than merely a continuing relationship between the 
physician and the patient.318 The underlying rationale is the existence 
of a "continuing trust and confidence" which warrants the tolling of 
the limitations period.319 In this respect, courts restrictively read 
CPLR section 214-a.320 Thus continuous treatment contemplates 
"scheduled appointments" for "future visits" and not merely a writ- 
ten request by a physician to see his patient seven months after sur- 
gery was performed.321 In addition, absent a clear agency 
relationship, the doctrine cannot be imputed from one doctor to an- 
other.322 Finally, treatment is not considered continuous when the 
interval between treatments exceeds the two and one half year limita- 
tion period.323 
In Jorge v. New York City Health and Hospitals,324 the Appellate 
Division for the First Department reinstated a medical malpractice 
317. See Goldsmith v. Howrnedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500 
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986) (holding that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice 
action based on a malfunctioning prosthetic device begins to run when the device is in- 
stalled and not from the time a patient is injured); In re Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780,391 N.E.2d 1002,417 
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
318. See Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896, 898,477 N.E.2d 210, 211,487 
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (1985) (citing Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939, 940,463 N.E.2d 371, 
372, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (1984)). 
319. Richardson, 64 N.Y.2d at 898, 477 N.E.2d at 21 1, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 732. 
320. See N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney 1990). 
321. DePeralta v. Presbyterian Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 346,503 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 
1986). But see Ward v. Kaufman, 120 A.D.2d 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 883 (4th Dep't 1986) 
(doctor's telephone call to plaintiff approximately two weeks after he applied a left tibial 
cast brace to her leg qualified as continuous treatment). 
322. See Modzelewski v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, 120 A.D.2d 498, 501 
N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't 1986); Otero v. Presbyterian Hosp., 116 A.D.2d 511, 497 
N.Y.S.2d 381 (1st Dep't 1986). 
323. See Sherry v. Queens Kidney Center, 117 A.D.2d 663,664,498 N.Y.S.2d 401, 
402 (2d Dep't 1986). 
324. 164 A.D.2d 650, 563 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1st Dep't 1990). Plaintiff's suit had been 
dismissed in Supreme Court in Manhattan on the ground that the statute of limitations 
began running seven months before the youngster's birth, which was on the date when his 
father's test for the sickle-cell trait was allegedly misread. The youngster's mother, who 
knew she was a camer of the genetic trait for sickle-cell anemia, sought the testing of her 
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claim brought on behalf of a five year old male born with sickle-cell 
anemia.325 The appellate division held that the one-year-and-90 days 
statute of limitations for iiling an action against a municipal defendant 
was tolled by the doctrine of continuous treatment until the boy's 
birth because his mother had sought and received genetic counselling 
regarding a specific condition, and the time limit did not begin to run 
until the pregnancy was terminated.326 In a strong dissent, Justice 
Wallach stated that the majority had engaged in an inappropriate ex- 
pansion of the continuous treatment doctrine to reach a sympathetic 
result on behalf of the plaintiffs.327 
C CPLR 203(b)(5) 
Last year's Survey pointed out that the sixty-day extension under 
CPLR section 203(b)(5) was applicable in federal diversity cases.J28 
We pointed out that courts had yet to resolve the question of whether 
delivery to the federal district court clerk also earned the time exten- 
sion.329 In Datskow v. Teledyne,330 the Court of Appeals for the Sec- 
ond Circuit held that service can be made on the federal marshal 
instead of the county sheriff and the district court clerk instead of the 
county The circuit court noted that this service does not im- 
pair any state interest in establishing limitations on time for the 
suit.332 Moreover, the circuit court stated that "the clerk of a district 
court may serve as the depository for a summons [under CPLR sec- 
tion203(b)(5)], whether the relevant county is within or without New 
husband and when informed that he was negative, she decided to proceed with the preg- 
nancy and gave bi ih  to her son. Id 
325. When the tests demonstrated that the baby had the disease, plaintiffs alleged 
that the father was tested again and found to be a carrier of the sickle-cell trait. Id. at 
652, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413. 
326. Id at 652, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413. 
327. Justice Wallach, in his dissent, emphasized that the medical care rendered to 
Ms. Jorge was "routine prenatal care, wholly unrelated to sickle-cell anemia" and, there- 
fore, the requirement that there be continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or 
condition which gave rise to the alleged malpractice was not satisfied. Id. at 653-54, 563 
N.Y.S.2d at 414. 
328. See Personis v. Oiler, 889 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1989) (Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that there was nothing in the text of CPLR 203(b)(5) that confines its 
effect to state court suits. The circuit court also stated that it had not located any legisla- 
tive history suggesting such a limitation.) 
329. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 104-05. 
330. 899 E2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1990). 
331. Id. at 1304. 
332. Id. 
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York City."333 A contrary result would, for example, create two sep- 
arate rules within the Eastern District of New York, one for cases 
within New York City and another for cases outside New York City. 
D. CPLR 214-a: Definition of the Term "Medical Malpractice" 
Last year's Survey discussed the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Scott v. Ufianov,334 which held that a claim against a hospital for neg- 
ligent supervision was subject to a two-and-one-half year limitations 
period instead of a three-year peri0d.~35 During the Survey year, sev- 
eral appellate division opinions have distinguished the Scott hold- 
ing.336 In Halas v. Parkway Hospital,f37 the Appellate Division for the 
Second Department held that a claim that the hospital was negligent 
in permitting a patient to remain in a hospital bed which lacked 
proper and adequate side rails, and in failing to supervise the patient 
properly, sounded in ordinary negligence.338 Thus, the patient was 
not barred from stating specific monetary damages in his ad damnum 
clauses of the complaint.339 Two months earlier, the Second Depart- 
ment reached a contrary result in Raus v. White Plains Hospital 340 In 
Raus, the appellate division believed that the action was based upon 
an improper assessment of the plaintx's condition and, therefore, 
bore a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment. 
As a result, the action was deemed malpractice rather than negli- 
g e n ~ e . ~ ~ l  The bottom line may depend on how the practitioner pleads 
333. Id. 
334. 74 N.Y.2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 398, 543 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1989). 
335. Plaintiff sustained an injury while in a bed in the emergency room. Almost 
three years later, he sued the hospital which claimed that his suit was a medical malprac- 
tice claim and, therefore, barred by the two and one-half year period under CPLR 214-a. 
The Court of Appeals unanimously held the claim to be one of malpractice and dismissed 
it. The Court reasoned that the hospital's supervision and treatment of a patient during 
his initial emergency room w e  constituted an integral part of the process of rendering 
medical treatment to him. 
336. See infra notes 337-341 and accompanying text. 
337. 158 A.D.2d 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1990). 
338. The appellate division stated that "[hlere, the gravamen of the complaint did 
not involve diagnosis, treatment or the failure to follow a physician's instruction. . . . The 
facts presented in this case establish that the patient's condition was delicate and a risk of 
harm was recognized." Halas, 158 A.D.2d at 516, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 280. 
339. Id. at 517, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 280 ("Since the nature of the conduct complained 
of may readily be assessed based upon common everyday experience of the trier of facts, 
the court properly determined that the action sounded in ordinary negligence."). 
340. 156 A.D.2d 354, 548 N.Y.S.2d 307 (2d Dep't 1989). 
341. Plaintiff received a sedative and about nine hours later fell out of the hospital 
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his case. 
E. CPLR 202: The Borrowing Statute 
CPLR 202 applies to actions brought by nonresidents based on 
causes of action which occurred outside New York.342 These actions 
are subject to the limitation periods of New York and of the state in 
which they accrued and, thus, are barred if either period has expired. 
Last year's S~rvey34~ discussed the Appellate Division for the First 
Department's decision in Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons3d4 and prom- 
ised to report on it this year. The Court of Appeals, without com- 
ment, ruled 6-0 to e the appellate division.345 Thus, it limited the 
number of women who can pursue DES related court claims against 
pharmaceutical companies under the state's toxic tort law. 
F. Uniform Federal Statute of Limitations for Some Private 
Securities Actions 
In Ceres Partners v. Gel Associates,346 the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit adopted a uniform federal limitations period for 
private securities claims under sections lob and 14 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934.347 Thus, claims must be commenced 
within one year of discovering the alleged wrongful conduct and 
within three years of the conduct's occurrence. The circuit court 
noted that century-old precedent required federal courts to borrow 
whatever period one state court would conclude a sister state's court 
might apply in a case over which neither has any jurisdiction.34* The 
court also noted that the practice of looking to state law to determine 
the applicable statute of limitations for implied causes of action under 
the federal securities laws has been the target of considerable criti- 
bed and sustained injuries. The appellate division stated, "[tlhe plaintiff's claim in this 
case is premised on an alleged improper assessment of her condition and as such bears a 
substantial relationship to the rendition of her medical treatment." 
342. See CPLR MANUAL, supra note 138, at 5 207. 
343. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 103. 
344. 146 A.D.2d 107,539 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1990) (holding that the one year 
revivor statute in CPLR 214-c did not apply to a claim of a nonresident of New York). 
345. See Besser v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 75 N.Y.2d 847, 552 N.E.2d 171, 552 
N.Y.S.2d 923 (1990). 
346. 918 F.2d at 349. 
347. See id. 
348. See id. at 352 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985)). 
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cisrn.349 The court explained that far from achieving any semblance 
of national uniformity, reference to state laws generally results in a 
lack of uniformity even within a given circuit.350 The circuit court 
also observed that while the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the pre- 
vailing practice of borrowing state law for limitations periods for fed- 
eral securities law claims, it has not explicitly approved the practice, 
and its recent discussions of such borrowing for other types of claims 
appear to leave open the possibility that the courts should look to a 
federal statute instead.351 
The circuit court did not address the issue of whether the new 
limitation should be applied retroactively. In Finkel v. Stratton,352 
however, a federal district court held that it would be "inequitable to 
apply Ceres retroactively so as to transform an action, timely when 
filed, into one barred forever by the statute of limitations."353 As a 
result, the district court held that New York investors had timely filed 
their complaint within the six years allowed under the New York 
State statute of limitations. Also regarding Welch v. Cadre 
which has been argued before the Second Circuit, the court is ex- 
pected to rule that the new uniform statute of limitations cannot be 
applied retroa~tively.35~ 
VI. RES JUDICATA 
Prior Survey articles356 have discussed the substantial develop- 
349. Id. at 355 (citing Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449,1457-58 & n. 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying a total of 26 separate statutes of limitations)). 
350. Id. at 354. 
351. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 355 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 
Inc. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). The United States Supreme Court ruled that a uniform statute 
of limitations, borrowed from the Clayton Act, should be applied to civil RICO actions. 
The Court then explained that among the themes to be distilled from the Supreme 
Court's recent borrowing discussions are that selection of a uniform federal limitations 
period may be warranted (1) where the statutory claim in question covers a multiplicity 
of types of actions, leading to the possible application of a number of different types of 
state statutes of limitations; (2) where the federal claim does not precisely match any 
state-law claim; (3) where the challenged action is multi-state in nature, perhaps leading 
to forum shopping and inordinate litigation expense; and (4) where a federal statute pro- 
vides a very close analogy. See generally id 
352. 754 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
353. Finkel, 754 F. Supp. at 332. 
354. 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cu. 1991). 
355. See Welch, 923 F.2d at 989. 
356. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 112-15; Carlisle, Civil 
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ments in the doctrines of claim preclusion357 and issue preclusion358 
with respect to civil litigation in New York. During the Survey year, 
courts continued to vigorously apply these doctrines to conserve judi- 
cial resources and to clear crowded dockets.359 In one case of first 
impression, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied issue 
preclusion to prevent a party from re-litigating the validity of a state 
court sanction and contempt 0rder.~~0 In a contested matrimonial 
matter, the Appellate Division for the First Department invoked issue 
preclusion to bar one spouse from re-litigating an earlier support or- 
der.361 In Milltex Industries v. Jacquard Lace,362 the Second Circuit 
reminded the bench and the bar that federal district courts in the Cir- 
cuit must give res judicata effect to state court judgments.363 Also in 
Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 79, at 120-26; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987Survey, supra 
note 89, at 107-18; Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 225, at 141-48. 
357. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars a 
subsequent action between the parties, or persons in privity with them, from relitigating 
the same cause of action. It bars the relitigation of claims which might have been liti- 
gated, as well as those which actually were litigated. See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 
N.Y.2d 353,429 N.E.2d 1158,445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 
54 N.Y.2d 185,429 N.E.2d 746,445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981). 
358. As the doctrine of issue preclusion now stands, a valid final judgment on the 
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction prevents relitigation by the parties or 
their privies of matters of fact or law actually litigated or necessarily determined in the 
earlier action. Two prerequisites must be met to apply the doctrine in New York courts. 
"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be 
decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded . . . must have had a 
full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449,453,482 N.E.2d 63, 66,492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985). 
359. See Zapata v. Town of Huntington, 203 N.Y.L.J. 106 (Sup. Ct., Suff. Co. 1990) 
(dismissal of federal civil rights claim bars state tort suit on same facts); Caruso & Sons 
Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Bldgs., N.Y.L.J., Sept 6, 1990, at 21, col. 
6; Gangitano v. TCI Constr. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 1990, at 18, col. 2 (set-off to Penn- 
sylvania mechanic's lien bars New York breach-of-contract suit); Glass v. Glass, 
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 30, col. 2 (issue of title to marital residence is barred by claim 
preclusion); Marcic v. Verkooyen, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 32, col. 6 (agency determi- 
nation precludes relitigation of same issue in court). See also Dachs & Dachs, Collateral 
Estoppel and Res Judicata in Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1990, at 3, col. 4; Barker, 
New York Practice: Collateral Estoppel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 3, col. 1. See gener- 
ally, Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Adminktrative Decision-making and Fed- 
eral Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367 (1990). 
360. Polur v. R a e ,  912 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1990). 
361. Labow v. Labow, 154 A.D.2d 90, 550 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1st Dep't 1990). 
362. 922 F.2d 164 (2d Cu. 1991). 
363. An Alabama state court rendered a decision several days before the district 
court in New York; the Second Cucuit held that the Alabama judgment must be given 
claim preclusion effect. Id 
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Lytle v. Household Manufacturing,364 the United States Supreme 
Court refused to give issue preclusion effect to a district court's deter- 
mination of issues common to equitable and legal claims under Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act365 and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.366 
The Court held that the prior holding in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,367 
that a court's determination of issues in an equitable action could col- 
laterally estop re-litigation of the same issues in a subsequent legal 
action without violating a litigant's right to a jury trial, could not be 
extended to the Lytle actions.368 These decisions demonstrate that the 
practitioner must be alert to the adverse consequences of the 
doctrine.369 
The most important res judicata developments during the Survey 
year relate to the recent expansion of the scope of issue preclusion by 
applying the doctrine to prior criminal issue determinations in order 
to preclude subsequent civil litigation.370 This is particularly true 
with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.371 The Court of 
Appeals decision in D'Arata v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insur- 
ance372 and two opinions by the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department373 will be analyzed. 
A. Background 
In the case of S T. Grand v. City of New York,374 the Court of 
Appeals first applied the doctrine of issue preclusion to a criminal 
-- - 
364. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990). 
365. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e 
(1982). 
366. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (1988). 
367. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
368. In Parklane, the Supreme Court held that a prior resolution of issues collater- 
ally estopped relitigation of the same issues in a second, separate action, even though the 
plaintif was entitled to a jury trial in the second action. The Court refused to extend the 
Parklane doctrine because the Lytle case involved only one suit in which the plaintiff 
properly joined his legal and equitable claims. 
369. See generally Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
63 (1986). 
370. See Carlisle, Issue Preclusion Eflect of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil 
Litigation, 17 WESTCHESTER B.J. 207 (1990); see also infra notes 370-417. 
371. See M i l e ,  Issue Preclusion, supra note 370, at 212-13. 
372. 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1990). 
373. See Sullivan v. Breese, 160 A.D.2d 997, 554 N.Y.S.2d 937 (2d Dep't 1990); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 160 A.D.2d 971, 554 N.Y.S.2d 939 (2d Dep't 1990). 
374. 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973). 
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conviction in order to preclude subsequent civil litigation.375 S.T. 
Grand, Inc. was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to use inter- 
state facilities with intent to violate the New York State bribery laws. 
The conviction stemmed from illegal activity on the part of S.T. 
Grand concerning a contract with New York City for the cleaning of 
a reservoir. Following the conviction, S.T. Grand sued the city for 
the unpaid balance due on the contract. The city fled a counterclaim 
for monies previously paid on the contract. Although the contract 
had been performed by S.T. Grand, the city moved for a summary 
judgment on the grounds of issue preclusion. It argued that S.T. 
Grand's criminal conviction was proof that the contract was illegal 
and there was no triable issue of fact. Special Term denied the sum- 
mary judgment motion, but the Appellate Division reversed and di- 
rected a verdict for the defendant.376 Plaintiff appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of issue preclusion was ap- 
plicable because issues necessarily decided in the criminal action were 
decisive to the civil action.377 
In Gilberg v. Barbieri,378 the Court of Appeals qualified its hold- 
ing in S. T Grand. A divided court held that an harassment convic- 
tion for assault would not preclude re-litigation of the identical issue 
in a civil lawsuit because the defendant demonstrated that the full and 
fair opportunity requirement had not been satisfied.379 The Gilberg 
court held that the defendant could not foresee that his conviction on 
375. See ST Grand, 32 N.Y.2d at 300, 298 N.E.2d at 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 938. 
376. Id. 
377. Id. at 304, 298 N.E.2d at 107, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 941. 
378. 53 N.Y.2d 285,423 N.E.2d 807,441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981). 
379. See Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The 
Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether a conviction for the petty offense of har- 
assment can later be used to preclude the defendant from disputing the merits of a civil 
suit for assault, involving the same incident and seeking a quarter of a million dollars." 
Id. at 288,423 N.E.2d at 807,441 N.Y.S.2d at 49. A divided Court of Appeals refused to 
give conclusive effect to the prior determination beyond the proceeding in which it was 
made. See id. at 292, 423 N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The majority found that 
the defendant was afforded neither an opportunity nor an incentive to litigate the harass- 
ment conviction thoroughly or as he might have if more were at stake. Id. at 293, 423 
N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court of Appeals noted that a contrary ruling 
would encourage civil litigants to file criminal complaints which would frustrate the very 
purpose of res judicata. Id. at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court 
also observed that future parties would be compelled to defend minor criminal charges 
with a vigor out of proportion to the charge and at variance with the proper function of 
the local criminal courts. Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at 294,423 N.E.2d at 810,441 N.Y.S.2d at 
52. 
Heinonline - -  42 Syracuse L. Rev. 388 1991 
19911 Civil Practice 389 
a violation would later be used to establish conclusive liability in a 
$250,000 personal injury suit. Therefore, he was not accorded a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.3S0 The Court of Appeals 
also emphasized the brisk and informal manner of the prior hearing 
and observed that the defendant had neither the opportunity nor the 
incentive to litigate as thoroughly as he might have if the stakes had 
been greater.381 In later cases, New York courts began to apply the 
doctrine of issue preclusion to criminal convictions based on guilty 
pleas.382 Courts held that a plea may preclude subsequent re-litiga- 
tion in a civil action of issues necessarily decided and actually litigated 
in prior criminal proceedings. 
B. D'Arata, Zuk, and Sullivan 
In D'Arata,383 the plaintiff, a shooting victim, sought to recover 
from the insurer of the assailant the amount of a default judgment 
obtained against the insured.384 The insured had been convicted after 
380. Id. 
381. Id. at 293,423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 
330 (it may be unfair to permit offensive use of collateral estoppel if defendant in first 
action was sued for nominal or small damages and subsequent lawsuit is unforeseeable 
because he may not have incentive to "defend vigorously"). 
382. See Abraho v. Perrault, 147 A.D.2d 824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 913 (3d Dep't 1989) 
(defendant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular manslaughter as a result of an auto 
accident; In a subsequent civil action, the court held that defendant's guilty plea pre- 
cluded him from relitigating the issue of his negligence concerning the accident); 
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1984) 
(appellate division recognized that there was no actual "litigation" involved in regard to 
the defendant's guilty plea, but still found that "the issues have necessarily been judicially 
determined by the plea so that the criminal defendant is estopped to contest them in 
subsequent civil litigation"). See also Gerney v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 136 Misc. 2d 
105, 518 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987) (crane operator pled guilty to second 
degree criminal assault, and in subsequent civil suit for personal injuries, plaintiff's sum- 
mary judgment motion was granted on the grounds that the identity of issue and fidl and 
fair opportunity requirements had been satisfied); McMillan v. Williams, 116 Misc. 2d 
171,455 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). In McMillan, the defendant had been 
convicted of assault after entering a plea of guilty. In a subsequent civil suit, Special 
Term gave the guilty plea the same preclusive effect against the defendant as it would 
after a full trial. Id See generally, Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Crimi- 
nal Determinations: Theoretical, Practical and Strategic Complications for Criminal and 
Civil Litigation, 70 GEO. L.J. 1079 (1982). 
383. 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1990). 
384. D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d at 662, 564 N.E.2d at 635, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 25. Plaintiff 
Robert D'Arata was the party who was shot. The Court of Appeals referred to the 
claims of plaintiff Daren D'Arata, Robert's wife, as derivative. Thus the plaintiffs were, 
when necessary, collectively referred to as plaintiff. Id. 
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a jury trial of first degree assault arising out of the in~ident.3~~ The 
insurance policy expressly excluded recovery for bodily injury "ex- 
pected or intended by the Insured."386 Thus, the issue before the 
Court was whether the insurer could use the insured's criminal judg- 
ment of conviction as a collateral bar to plaintiff's attempt in a civil 
case to re-litigate the issue of his assailant's intent to injure.387 The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division and held that the 
plaintiff should be collaterally estopped and that the action, therefore, 
was properly dismissed.388 
The initial question for the Court to determine was whether 
plaintiff, a nonparty to the prior criminal proceeding, should be 
bound by the adverse determination on intent in that proceeding. 
This required a finding that the plaintiff was in privity with his assail- 
ant. The Court pointed to Insurance Law section 3420(b)(1)389 which 
permitted plaintiff to maintain a direct action against the insurer on 
the plicy.390 The Court explained that plaintiff was standing in the 
shoes of the insured and could have no greater rights than the in- 
sured. Thus, the inevitable consequence of plaintiff's election to pro- 
ceed against defendant under the Insurance Law was that he was in 
legal privity with the claimed insured for the purpose of an issue pre- 
clusion analysis.39 
385. Id. (plaintiff, the complaining witness, test%& for the prosecution in the crimi- 
nal case). 
386. Id. 
387. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (1) (McKinney 1987) states that a person is guilty 
of assault in the first degree when "[wlith intent to cause serious physical injury to an- 
other person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a 
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." 
388. See infra notes 392-401. 
389. See N.Y. INS. LAW 5 3420 (McKinney Supp. 1990) which provides: 
@) . . . an action may be maintained by the following persons against the in- 
surer upon any policy or contract of liabiity insurance . . . to recover the 
amount of a judgment against the insured. . . (1) any person. . . has obtained a 
judgment against the insured . . . for damages for injury sustained or loss or 
damage occasioned during the life of the policy or contract . . . . 
390. D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d 659,564 N.E.2d 634,563 N.Y.S.2d 24. The Court of Ap- 
peals observed that "plaintiff 'stands in the shoes' of the insured and can have no greater 
rights than the insured . . . [and] by proceeding directly against defendant, does so as 
subrogee of the insured's rights and is subject to whatever rules of estoppel would apply 
to the insured." Id. at 665, 564 N.E.2d at 637, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
391. Id. ('("Generally a nonparty to a prior litigation may be collaterally estopped by 
a determination in that litigation by having a relationship with a party to the prior litiga- 
tion such that his own rights or obligations in the subsequent proceeding are conditioned 
in one way or another on, or derivative of, the rights of the party to the prior litigation!'). 
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The next question for the Court of Appeals to determine was 
whether the two basic requirements for invoking the doctrine of issue 
preclusion had been satisfied.392 The Court easily concluded that the 
"full and fair opportunity" requirement was satisfied because the in- 
sured had a jury trial which resulted in a verdict in which all of the 
elements of the crime, including intent, were necessarily proven 
against him.393 The Court then addressed the more difficult question 
of whether the defendant had proven the requisite identity of the issue 
between the civil case and the prior criminal proceeding.3g4 The 
Court explained that it must be shown by the moving party that the 
identical issue was necessarily decided in the first proceeding and is 
conclusive in the subsequent action.395 In addition, the court stated 
that it must be shown that the issue was "actually litigated" in the 
first proceeding.396 Plaintiff argued that the issue of the insured's in- 
tent was never contested in the first proceeding because the defenses 
at the trial were mistaken identification and alibi.397 Furthermore, the 
insured had "simply defaulted as to that portion of the indictment 
that alleged the action was intentional."398 The Court rejected this 
argument on the grounds that the jury had to be satisfied that the 
prosecution had met its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt or else there would not have been a guilty verdict.399 The plain- 
tiff also argued that issue preclusion should not be applied "based on 
general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the reali- 
ties of the litigation."m The Court rejected this argument on the pol- 
icy ground of minimiziig inconsistent judgments.401 
392. Id. ("We turn to the question of whether the two basic requirements for invok- 
ing collateral estoppel have been satisfied: (1) that the identical issue was necessarily 
decided in the prior proceeding and is decisive of the present action, and (2) that there 
was a full and fair opportunity to contest that issue in the prior proceeding."). 
393. See D'Arata, 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24. 
394. See id. 
395. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, g 27, comment c). 
396. Id. Generally for "a question to have been actually litigated so as to satisfy the 
identity requirement it must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise 
placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding." Halyalkar v. Board of 
Regents, 72 N.Y.2d 261, 268, 527 N.E.2d 1222, 1226, 532 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (1988); see 
also WATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, 27, comments d & e. 




401. Id. Indeed, it would be anomalous to permit plaints now to relitigate an issue 
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In Sullivan v. Breese'402 the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department directly addressed the issue of whether issue preclusion 
effect should be given to a defendant's guilty plea in a subsequent civil 
suit.403 The appellate division focused on whether re-litigation 
should be permitted in light of competing policy considerations.~ 
These include fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of 
the court and the litigants, and societal interests in consistent and ac- 
curate results.405 The appellate division emphasized that these factors 
may vary in relative importance depending on the nature of the pro- 
ceedings.406 In Sullivan, the Second Department refused to apply is- 
sue preclusion because the stakes were so trivial that the defendant 
had no motivation to fully and vigorously litigate his criminal 
conviction.407 
In Allstate Insurance v. Zuk,408 the defendant pled guilty to sec- 
ond degree manslaughter for the death of Michael Smith. Subse- 
quently, decedent's spouse brought a wrongful death action against 
defendant, who was insured by Allstate.409 Allstate commenced an 
action for a declaratory judgment that it was not obliged to indemnify 
defendant because its policy coverage excluded any injuries resulting 
from the intentional acts of the insured party.410 The appellate divi- 
sion held that defendant's guilty plea had conclusively established the 
issue of defendant's intent.411 They applied the doctrine of issue pre- 
clusion and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.412 The 
Zuk decision is, arguably, distinguishable from Sullivan because of 
the seriousness of the second degree manslaughter charges that 
prompted Zuk to enter a guilty plea. 
The Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal in Zuk413 and 
we will report its decision in next year's Survey. The Court will have 
which the jury has already determined under a higher standard of proof in the criminal 
case in which plaintiff, himself, gave evidence supporting the jury's finding. 
402. 160 A.D.2d 997, 554 N.Y.S.2d 937 (2d Dep't 1990). 
403. Id at 997-98, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38. 
404. Id. at 998, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 938. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. 
407. Id. at 999, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 939. 
408. 160 A.D.2d 971, 972, 554 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940 (2d Dep't 1990). 
409. Id. 
410. Id 
41 1. Id at 972-73, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 940. 
412. Id. at 973, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 940. 
413. 76 N.Y.2d 711, 565 N.E.2d 516, 563 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1990). 
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to determine the diflicult question of whether the identity of issue re- 
quirement was met. In DYrata the jury had to find intent to convict 
the defendant.414 In Zuk there is the question of whether a guilty plea 
to manslaughter in the second degree involves intent.415 To establish 
identity of issue, the party moving for invocation of issue preclusion 
must establish that Zuk did more than act recklessly when the under- 
lying incident occurred.416 The Court of Appeals must also face the 
policy issue of whether a future defendant will be reluctant to enter a 
guilty plea if he anticipates it will be used against him in a subsequent 
civil proceeding. It seems unlikely that Michael Milken would have 
pled guilty in federal court to six counts of conspiracy and fraud if he 
knew issue determinations necessary to his plea could later be used to 
conclusively establish liability against him in New York State civil 
litigation.417 
VII. SANCTION CASES, MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION, AND COMPULSORY PRO BONO 
A. Sanction Decisions 
Last year's Survey discussed many of the recent sanction deci- 
sions which New York State trial courts issued pursuant to the new 
414. See D'Amta, 76 N.Y.2d 659, 564 N.E.2d 634, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24. Here, of 
course, in the criminal proceeding the People bore the burden of proving the defendant's 
intent to injure plaintiff (see N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 120.10[1]). The issue of intent was 
necessarily submitted to the jury in the court's charge as a factual question on an essential 
element of the crime. Id. at 664, 564 N.E.2d at 637, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
415. Zuk pleaded guilty to second degree manslaughter, which is an unintentional 
crime. See N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 125 (McKinney 1990). 
416. See Zuk, 160 A.D.2d at 972,554 N.Y.S.2d at 940, where the appellate division 
held: "When Zuk pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree in the criminal 
prosecution arising out of this incident, it was necessarily determined that the decedent's 
death was caused by Zuk's 'criminal act.' " Allstate submitted no proof that the result in 
this case was ever expected by the insured. Thus arguably the case falls within the "acci- 
dent" rule of the decided cases. See Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 
N.E.2d 258, 389 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1976) (accidental death from intentional dose of heroin); 
Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual Lie  Ins. Co., 64 Misc. 2d 791, 316 N.Y.S.2d 722 
(1970) (same); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937) 
(same); Adlerblum v. Metropolitan Lie  Ins. Co., 284 N.Y. 695, 30 N.E.2d 728 (1940) 
(accidental death from reaction to novacaine intentionally administered for tonsilitis); 
Gallagher v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 163 A.D. 556, 148 N.Y.S. 1016 (2d Dep't 1914), 
a r d ,  221 N.Y. 664, 117 N.E. 1067 (1917) (accidental death from sunstroke while at- 
tempting to tan). 
417. See Adams, Defense Lawyers Surprised at Milken Sentence, 204 N.Y.L.J. 100 
(1990). 
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rules for frivolous litigation that became effective January 1, 1989.4'* 
During this Survey year, the Court of Appeals imposed sanctions for 
the first time under the new rule~.~19 Several appellate divisions also 
issued sanction opinions,420 and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
sanctions could be awarded against a plaintiff who had voluntarily 
dismissed his complaint.421 
In Minister, Elders and Deacons of the Reformed Protestant 
Church of the City of New York v. 198 Broadway Inc. ,422 the Court of 
Appeals, in a per curiam decision, imposed a $2,500 sanction on an 
overly persistent litigant at the request of his adversary.423 This was 
the first time the Court of Appeals applied Part 130 of the Uniform 
Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.424 The respondent had 
made a series of motions425 which the Court found to be "utterly 
without legal s~ppor t "~~6  and made for the sole purpose of delaying 
418. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 71-78. 
419. See Ministers, Elders, & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of 
the City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 411, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d 
886 (1990); John B. Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 930, 
564 N.E.2d 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1990); Maroulis v. 64th St. - Third Ave. Assoc., 77 
N.Y.2d 831, 567 N.E.2d 978, 566 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1991). 
420. See Hoeflich v. Chemical Bank, 149 A.D.2d 341,539 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 
1989); see aZso Strout Realty Inc. v. Mechta, - A.D.2d -, 565 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2d Dep't 
1991) (appeal so obviously lacking in merit that it was characterized as frivolous and 
Mechta was ordered to pay $3,949 in costs and sanctions); Grasso v. Matthew, 164 
A.D.2d 476, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991) (imposing court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees against attorney pursuant to CPLR 8303-a). 
421. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990). 
422. 76 N.Y.2d 41 1, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1990). 
423. Ministers, Elders, & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 411, 559 N.E.2d at 429, 559 
N.Y.S.2d at 886. The respondent, Modell, sought to renew its sublease but was denied 
right to do so because of the master tenant's decision not to renew the lease. The Appel- 
late Division for the First Department awarded petitioner possession of the premises in 
1982, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division order in 1983. The re- 
spondent then sought a declaratory judgment action based on a new legal theory, and 
filed an unsuccessll appeal to the Court of Appeals from an appellate division order 
dismissing that action. Thereafter respondent filed various other post-appeal motions 
with the Court of Appeals and two separate motions at the trial court to vacate the 
dispossess judgment upheld by the Court of Appeals. Finally respondent moved for an 
order recalling and amending the remittitur of the 1983 decision. The Court of Appelas, 
in imposing sanctions, dismissed Modell's motion as "plainly untimely," and noted that 
the time for making such motions had expired almost seven years before. Id. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
426. Id. 
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enforcement of an earlier j~dgment.~27 The Court of Appeals im- 
posed sanctions for the second time in John B. Bell v. The New York 
Higher Education Assistance428 The Court granted respondent's mo- 
tion for sanctions on the ground that appellant had filed a chain of 
motions which constituted a dilatory and frivolous avoidance of a 20- 
year old student loan debt.429 The Court also found that appellant 
had failed to pay motion costs previously imposed by the Court of 
Appeals, and therefore imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,000.430 
In both Bell and Minister, sanctions were imposed for misconduct oc- 
curring in both the lower courts and the Court of Appeals. The Court 
has yet to award sanctions simply for frivolous conduct in the courts 
below, nor has the Court imposed a $2500 sanction on an attorney for 
frivolous litigation practi~es.43~ 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartrnar~43~ the U.S. Supreme Court was 
faced with three issues relating to the application of Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: first, whether a district court may 
impose Rule 11 sanctions on a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed 
his complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(i);433 second, what constitutes 
the appropriate standard of appellate review of a district court's impo- 
sition of Rule 11 sanctions;434 and third, whether Rule 11 sanctions 
authorize awards of attorney fees incurred on appeal of a Rule 11 
sanction.435 The Supreme Court held that a voluntary Rule 41 dis- 
missal did not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a Rule 11 
motion.436 The Court also held that federal appellate courts should 
apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a 
-- - - -  
427. Ministers, Elders & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 
N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
428. 76 N.Y.2d 930, 564 N.E.2d 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1990). 
429. The Court of Appeals dismissed a motion for leave to appeal on the grounds 
that the orders appellant sought to appeal from were not final. The Court also granted 
respondent's motion for sanctions and noted that appellant had filed five motions "in a 
chain reflecting a strategy of dilatory, frivolous avoidance of a 20 year old student loan 
debt for two years' law school education." Bell, 76 N.Y.2d at 930, 565 N.E.2d at 664, 
563 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
430. Id 
431. See Mamulis, 77 N.Y.2d 831, 567 N.E.2d 978, 556 N.Y.S.2d 584. 
432. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990). 
433. Cooter & Gell, 110 S.Ct. at2449. 
434. Id. at 2450. 
435. Id. at 2451. 
436. Id at 2449. This view is consistent with Rule ll's purposes of deterring base- 
less filings and streamlining federal court procedure and is not contradicted by anything 
in that rule or Rule 41(a)(l)(i). 
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district court's decision in a Rule 11 proceeding.437 Finally, the 
Supreme Court held that Rule 11 does not authorize a district court 
to award attorney's fees incurred on appeal.438 The Cooter decision 
was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Mareno v. Rowe.439 The district court had imposed Rule 11 sanctions 
on Mareno for frivolously asserting jurisdiction over the defendant 
pursuant to the New York long arm statute.440 The Circuit Court, 
with a strong dissenting opinion, found that the positions advanced by 
Mareno and his attorney were not so untenable as a matter of law as 
to necessitate sanction.41 The Court held that the award of a $4,800 
sanction was inappropriate and failed to recognize the complexities of 
New York's long arm jurisprudence.42 
Three appellate divisions issued instructive sanction opinions. In 
Hoeflich v. Chemical Bank43 the First Department imposed a sanc- 
tion of $500 on the executor of an estate who had brought a frivolous 
motion to vacate an earlier order of the court.444 In Mechta v. 
Mack45 the Second Department imposed a $1,000 sanction on apm 
se plaintiff's attorney for his conduct in pursuing frivolous appeals 
437. Id Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have applied a three- 
tiered standard of review. This included a clearly erroneous standard for findings of his- 
torical fact, a de novo standard for the determination that counsel violated Rule 11, and 
an abuse of discretion standard for the choice of sanction. The Supreme Court rejected 
the petitioner's approach primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals must defer 
to the district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings. 
438. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2449. The Supreme Court held that neither the 
language of Rule 11's sanctions provisions, when read in connection with Rule 1's state- 
ment that the Rules only govern district court procedure, nor the Advisory Committee 
Note suggests that Rule 11 could require payment for appellate proceedings. 
439. 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990). 
440. Mareno, 910 E2d at 1044. (Mareno argued that the defendants were amenable 
to suit under New York's corporate presence doctrine and under its long arm statute). 
See N.Y. CPLR 301, 302(a)(3). 
441. 910 E2d 1047. "There is no doubt that the arguments presented by Mareno 
were not persuasive. Nevertheless, to constitute a frivolous legal position for purposes of 
Rule 11 sanction, it must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of 
success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands." 
Id (citations omitted). 
442. Id. at 1047. The positions advanced by Mareno and his attorney, however 
faulty, were not so untenable as a matter of law as to necessitate sanction. Nor did they 
constitute the type of abuse of the adversary system that Rule 11 was designed to guard 
against. Id. at 1047. 
443. 149 A.D.2d 341, 539 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1989). 
444. Hoejlich, 149 A.D.2d at 341, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17. 
445. 149 A.D.2d 747, 549 N.Y.S.2d 508 (2d Dep't 1989). 
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from two orders of the Supreme Court.446 Mechta claimed at oral 
argument to have researched the issues relevant to the subject appeal 
and expended a total of two and a half days in preparing the appellate 
brief.447 The Second Department held that even a cursory review of 
law in the area of defamation would have revealed that Mechta's ac- 
tion was totally devoid of legal merit.448 The appellate division also 
found that Mechta's "conduct not only constituted a misuse of and a 
burden on judicial resources, but also placed a substantial burden on 
the defendants in time and costs associated with a defense of the ap- 
peal."449 In Grasso v. Mathew,4" the Third Department imposed 
sanctions under CPLR 8303-a against a Schenectady lawyer who filed 
a libel suit against the husband of his client in a divorce action.4" 
The appellate division held that the husband's comments enjoyed an 
absolute privilege, and that the lawyer's defamation action was 
frivol0us.45~ 
On an issue of first impression in New York, a federal district 
court ordered an attorney to submit to remedial legal education in 
lieu of monetary sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce- 
dure 1 1.453 The district court, through a magistrate, found that plain- 
tiffs' counsel had little litigation experience and that attorney 
ineptitude is not cured by high monetary ~enalties.~54 The magistrate 
concluded that the deterrent function of Rule 11 would be better 
served by a sanction tailored to improving the lawyers skills as a prac- 
ticing attorney so that he would not make similar mistakes in the fu- 
The magistrate directed plaintiffs' counsel to attend a two day 
course in federal practice and procedure offered by one of the bar 
associations, or a one semester course in the same area at an accred- 
ited law schoo1.456 
Finally, the New York State Bar Association has recommended 




450. 164 A.D.2d 476, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991). 
45 1. Grasso, 164 A.D.2d at 477, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 577. 
452. Id. at 479-80, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79. 
453. See Versailles Realty Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 1190 W L  
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that there be significant amendments made to Part 130 of the Rules of 
the Chief Administrative Judge, which authorizes a fine of as much as 
$10,000 for frivolous behavior.457 A special committee, chaired by 
former Court of Appeals Judge Hugh R. Jones, submitted a report on 
March 20, 1990 which warns that the current rule may unnecessarily 
chill access to the New York State courts without preventing the con- 
duct that actually causes needless expense and delay.458 The Jones 
Committee also recommended that the rule's focus be changed from a 
ban on "frivolous" conduct to "abusive" conduct.459 The State Legis- 
lature continues to oppose the new sanction rule.- 
B. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education 
Last year's Survey discussed the arguments for and against 
mandatory continuing legal education ("CLE").461 During the Sur- 
vey year the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Associa- 
tion adopted a resolution favoring the general concept of mandatory 
CLE.462 Later, the House considered specific provisions of the pro- 
posed rule and suggested  amendment^.^^ After adopting certain 
amendments, the House endorsed a proposed rule.* The State Asso- 
ciation is now proposing this rule for promulgation by the appropriate 
authority.465 The rule provides for the appointment of a continuing 
legal education commission,466 and requires every active attorney ad- 
mitted and practicing in the state to complete eighteen hours of con- 
tinuing legal education biennially, at least two hours of which shall 
457. See New York State Bar Association, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO 
CONSIDER SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS, 
March 20, 1990 [hereinafter BAR ASSOC. REPORT] (copy on file with the Syracuse Law 
Review). 
458. Id. at 5-6. 
459. Id. 
460. Id. See also Spencer, State Bar Seeks to Cut Finesjbm Lawyer Sanction Rules, 
N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1990, p.1, col. 3. 
461. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, I989 Survey, supra note 34, at 78-82. 
462. See Spencer, Mandatory CLE Wins Approval of State Bar, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 
1990, p.1, col. 5. 
463. Id. 
464. Id. 
465. See generally Wise, Lawyers Education: A Legklative Isrue, 203 N.Y.L.J. 51 
(1990); Ostertag, In Defense of MCLE, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 3; McKay, 
MCLE: Try It, You May Like It, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1990, at 2, col. 6. 
466. See New York State Bar Association, DRAF~ 4: Mandatory Continuing Legal 
Education For Attorneys (AS ADOPTED AT THE JUNE 22, 1990 HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
MEETING) (COPY ON FILE WITH THE SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW). 
Heinonline - -  42 Syracuse L. Rev. 398 1991 
19911 Civil Practice 399 
consist of education relating to professional responsibility and legal 
ethi~s.4~7 All attorneys subject to the rule must, at the time of their 
biennial registration, report their participation in CLE activities dur- 
ing the preceding twenty-four months.&* If an attorney fails to com- 
ply with the Rule, the CLE Commission will send a notice of 
delinquency to the attorney.469 Within ninety days following receipt 
of the notice, the attorney must cure the delinquency or the matter 
will be referred to the appropriate appellate division of the supreme 
court for disciplinary action.470 It is expected that the chief judge will 
implement the rule through the Judiciary Law so that noncompliance 
will constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and, thus, be subject to enforcement. 
It should be noted that one-half of the proposed eighteen hour 
CLE requirement can be satisfied by videotape or in house CLE 
presentations. It is anticipated that the Chief Judge of the State of 
New York will implement the CLE rule in 1992 or 1993. 
C CompuIsory Pro Bono 
Last year's Survey discussed the merits of mandatory pro bono 
("MPB)471 which has divided the bench and bar.472 Chief Judge 
Wachtler appointed an advisory panel which proposed that all of New 
York's lawyers donate at least twenty hours of free legal time a year 
to pro bono proje~ts.473 After the proposal was submitted to Chief 
Judge Wachtler in early 1990, he gave the state and local bar associa- 
tions two years to show whether a voluntary pro bono program could 
meet the legal needs of the poor.474 The Chief Judge has also ap- 
pointed a Pro Bono Review Committee to monitor how well the pro- 
467. Id. at 4-5. 
468. Id. at 5-6. 
469. Id 
470. Id. at 6-7. 
471. See Carliile, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 82-84. 
472. Id. 
473. Id. See also New York State Bar Association, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COM- 
MITTEE TO REVIEW THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR MANDATORY PRO BONO SERVICE, OC- 
tober 16, 1989. 
474. Adarns, Wachtler Defers Mandatoly Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1990, at 1, col. 
3. Chief Judge Wachtler gave the New York bar a two-year deadline to demonstrate that 
voluntary services could be sufficiently increased. If pro bono service "does not meet the 
desperate need [for legal services], I will propose . . . a rule be promulgated mandating 
pro bono services for the poor as recommended by the Marrero Committee." Id. 
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gram works.475 The Committee plans to do some kind of objective 
~urvey.4~~ The New York State Bar Association has proposed that 
the State Office of Court Administration require attorneys to report 
on their pro bono work as part of their biennial registration.477 The 
New York County Lawyers Association and five other county bar 
groups have opposed any plan to survey lawyers or to require them to 
file reports regarding their pro bono  contribution^.^^^ 
VIII. DISCLOSURE 
There were several major disclosure decisions during the Survey 
~ear.~79 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that universities 
and colleges charged with discrimination in tenure determinations 
must make relevant personnel files available to Federal investiga- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~  The New York Court of Appeals defined the parameters of 
discovery against corporations481 and one appellate division issued 
important opinions regarding discovery access to surveillance photo- 
graphs482 and internal investigation for corporate clients.483 A state 
trial court held that the medical records of family members of DES 
plaintiffs are discoverable484 and another trial court ruled that a plain- 
tiff may depose itself.485 These and other decisions will be analyzed. 
In University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
475. Spencer, Chief Judge Names Panel To Monitor Pm Bono Effort, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 
11, 1990, at 1, col. 3. Panelists to monitor the voluntary pro bono program are: Victor 
Marrero, Esq.; Justin Vigdor, Esq.; Joseph S. Genova, Esq.; and Robert Ostertag, Esq. 
The Committee will endeavor to determine how much time attorneys in New York 
devote to providing free civil legal services. 
476. See Vol. 32, No. 5 State Bar News, Wachtler Endorses Voluntary Pm Bono For 
2 Years; Will Decide Then About Mandatory, at 1, col. 3 (May 1990). 
477. Spencer, Pro Bono Reporting by Individuals Opposed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1990, 
at 1, col. 3. See generally, Dean, Voluntaly or Mandatory Service, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 
1990, at 3, col. 1. 
478. Id. 
479. See infra notes 480-51 1 and accompanying text. 
480. University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 577 
(1990). 
481. See Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 558 N.Y.S.2d 493 
(1990). 
482. Marte v. W.O. Hickok Mfg. Co., 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 
1990). 
483. Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 157 A.D.2d 444, 558 
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1990). 
484. Blank v. Eli Lilly & Co., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 1990, at 1, col. -. 
485. Sigman-Weiss Consultants Inc. v. RaS, 149 Misc.2d 11 1, 563 N.Y.S.2d 618 
(Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 1990). 
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Commission486 an educator fded a discrimination complaint against a 
university with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.487 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that there was not a common law privi- 
lege against the disclosure of confidential peer review documents and 
that there was no first amendment right of "academic freedom" 
against the disclosure of the contested doc~ments.48~ 
Last year's Survey criticized the appellate division's decision in 
Niesig v. Team I.489 We pointed out that the Second Department's 
presumption that all current employees are agents of a corporation 
contradicts the Court of Appeals' view as to the attorney-client rela- 
tionship.490 We also suggested that the Niesig opinion was contrary to 
the Court of Appeals' decision in Rossi v. BIue Cross & BIue Shield491 
and that it failed to provide adequate guidelines for corporate counsel 
who face serious conflict of interest problems. During the Survey year 
the Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division decision which 
had barred all ex parte communication with corporate employees.492 
The Court noted that the appellate division's ruling, which prohibited 
lawyers from interviewing a party without consent of the party's at- 
torney, had the advantage of being clear but that it closed off avenues 
of informal discovery of information that may serve both the litigants 
and the entire justice system.493 The Court of Appeals, speaking 
through Judge Kaye, adopted an "alter ego" test which defines a 
party to include only corporate employees whose acts or omissions 
are binding on the corporation or imputed to the corporation for pur- 
poses of its liability, or to employees who are deemed to be imple- 
menting the advice of counsel.494 The Court held that all other 
employees may be interviewed informally.495 Judge Bellacosa con- 
curred and pointed out that the "alter ego" definition will function 
almost identically with the rejected "blanket preclusion" definition 
used by the appellate division.496 Judge Bellacosa suggested that par- 
486. 110 s .  Ct. 557 (1990). 
487. University of Pa ,  110 S. Ct. at 580. 
488. Id. at 588-89. 
489. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 1 11-12 (criticizing 
N e k i ~ ) .  
490. Id. 
491. 73  N.Y.2d 588, 540 N.E.2d 703, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1989). 
492, Niesig, 76  N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499. 
493. Id. at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. 
494. Id. at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498. 
495. Id. 
496. Id. at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500. 
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ties should be limited to a "control group" of only those corporate 
employees who are among the most senior management who exercise 
substantial control over the corporation.497 Judge Bellacosa also em- 
phasized that attorney-client communications are unaffected by the 
Court of Appeals holding in the Niesig case.498 
In Marte v. W.O. Hickol Manufacturing,499 the First Department 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to the discovery of surveillance 
videos taken in a personal injury action.500 The appellate division 
rested its decision on the grounds that the plaintiff should be given an 
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the tapes prior to trial. 
Nonetheless, the appellate division held that it is permissible to delay 
the surveillance disclosure until after the defendant has had a full op- 
portunity to depose the plaintiff.501 Thus, the testimony may be pre- 
served for impeachment purposes at trial. In Spectrum Systems 
International v. Chemical Bank,502 the First Department afErmed a 
lower court's decision that documents prepared by a law firm for a 
bank in the course of an investigation into allegations of fraud were 
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.503 The appellate divi- 
sion reasoned that since the role of the law firm was that of an investi- 
gator retained to develop facts rather than to render legal opinions, 
their work product was not exempt from discovery.504 The First De- 
partment also noted that to qualify as "litigation" material under 
CPLR 3101(d)(2), documents must be prepared primarily, if not 
solely, for litigation.505 In another interesting decision, the Appellate 
Division for the Fourth Department held that CPLR 31 17(a)(2)506 
does not apply when an adverse party seeks to use a deposed em- 
ployee's deposition if the employer is no longer a party to the 
action. 
In Blank v. Eli Lilly,508 Justice Ira Gammerman was asked to 
497. Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499-500. 
498. Id. at 378, 558 N.E.2d at 1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500. 
499. 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 1990). 
500. Marte, 154 A.D.2d at 177, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 300. 
501. Id. 
502. 157 A.D.2d 444, 558 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1990). 
503. Spectrum Systems, 157 A.D.2d at 448, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 488. 
504. Id. 
505. Id. 
506. State University Construction Fund v. Kipphut & Newmann Co., Inc., 159 
A.D.2d 1003, 1005, 552 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (4th Dep't 1990). 
507. Id. 
508. 204 N.Y.L.J. 45, Sept. 4, 1990, at 23 col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1990). 
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determine if plaintiffs' family members' records were discoverable. 
Justice Gammerman rejected the plaintiff's contention that the dis- 
covery of medical records of their mothers, fathers, siblings and other 
family members was covered by the physician-patient pri~ilege.~Og In 
Sigman-Weiss Consultants v. Raif,slo Justice Spodek held that the 
plaintiff in a fraud suit had the right to take its own deposition to be 
used if the defendant, a man in poor health, expired before trial. The 
deposition the plaintiff sought to take was one of its own partners who 
claimed to have had conversations about the contested matter with 
the defendant.511 
A. Pleadings and Motions 
In Ministers, Elders & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch 
Church of the City of New York,512 the Court of Appeals for the first 
time imposed sanctions under newly enacted Part 130 of the Uniform 
Rules of the Court against a litigant for frivolous motion practice.513 
The Court defined a motion as frivolous if it is completely without 
merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by any reasonable argu- 
ment for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.514 In 
this respect, the practitioner is reminded that he must assert a juris- 
dictional defense in his CPLR 3211 motion or it will be waived.5l5 
Similarly, if the defense is not asserted by motion or answer, it usually 
cannot be asserted in an amended answer.s16 On the other hand, if 
there is no merit to the defense, the practitioner may face sanctions 
for filing a frivolous pleading.517 On a similar tack, a notice defect is 
waived if not raised in an answer or by motion.518 Also, an attempt to 
509. I d  
510. 149 Misc.2d 111, 563 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1990). 
51 1. Sigman- Weiss, 149 Misc. 2d at 112, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 619. 
512. 76 N.Y.2d 411, 559 N.E.2d 429, 559 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1990). 
513. Ministers, Elders & Deacons, 76 N.Y.2d at 413, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 
N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
514. Id. at 414, 559 N.E.2d at 430, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
515. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 34, at 98 (citing Addesso v. 
Shemtob, 70 N.Y.2d 689, 512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987)). 
516. Id. 
517. I d  
518. See Sandoval v. New York,  147 Misc. 2d 1072, 559 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Ct. of 
Claims 1990). 
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amend a complaint, without leave of court, is a nullity.519 
The Appellate Division for the Second Department, in an issue 
of first impression, has ruled that a civil plaintiff's case should not be 
summarily dismissed after his attorney's opening statement unless the 
lawyer is given an opportunity to correct the deficien~y.5~~ Thus if an 
opening statement fails to make out a prima facie case, the attorney 
for the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to correct any defi- 
ciency in the opening. 
In Sheridan v. Citicorp North Ameri~a ,~~l  petitioner sought to va- 
cate respondent's execution with notice to the garnishee. The trial 
court held that petitioner merely presented an ailidavit and obtained 
an order to show cause on it. Thus, instead of commencing a special 
proceeding, he brought on a mere practice motion. This meant that 
the court could not deem the papers to be pleadings and had to dis- 
miss the case. In Jimenez v. C h a s i ~ , ~ ~ ~  the trial court dismissed a legal 
malpractice case because when the suit was begun the underlying ac- 
tion commenced on plaintiff's behalf was not yet terminated. The 
court held the suit was premature and noted that premature com- 
mencement of actions unneccesarily overburdened the ~ o u r t . 5 ~ ~  
B. Venue and Appeals 
The most significant venue case decided during the Survey year is 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ferens v. John Deere.524 The 
Court held that the law of the transferor forum applies when a diver- 
sity suit is transferred under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a),525 regardless 
of who initiates the transfer. A Pennsylvania farmer lost his hand 
when it became caught in a combine harvester made by the defendant. 
Subsequent to the expiration of the Pennsylvania tort statute of limi- 
tations, plaintiff filed contract and warranty claims in a Pennsylvania 
federal court. He later filed a tort suit in federal court in Mississippi 
because that state had a six-year tort limitations period. He then 
moved to transfer that suit to federal court in Pennsylvania and retain 
the benefit of the Mississippi statute of limitations law. The U.S. 
5 19. See Eustace v. Club Med, 204 N.Y.L.J. 98 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1990). 
520. Devito v. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d 413, 556 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1990). 
521. 204 N.Y.L.J. 36 (Nassau Co., Sup. Ct. 1990). 
522. N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990, at 24 col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1990). 
523. Id. 
524. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). 
525. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1988). 
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Supreme Court held that section 1404(a) transfers should not create 
or increase forum shopping opportunities and that such transfers 
should turn on considerations of convenience and the interest of jus- 
tice, rather than the possible prejudice resulting from a change of 
law.526 Thus the court held that any reward for the plaintiff's 
manipulativeness is less repugnant than requiring suits in two fo- 
r~ms.52~ Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and 
Blackmun dissented on the grounds that the court's rule would allow 
plaintiffs to use the accident of diversity to obtain the application of a 
different law within the state where they litigate, contravening the in- 
tent behind Erie Railroad v. Tomkins.528 
The bar should be alert to the desire of the Court of Appeals to 
encourage motions for amicus curiae relief. These motions must com- 
ply with the general rules governing motions in the Court of Appeals, 
specifically Court of Appeals Rule 500.1 1 [a], PI, [c], and M.529 They 
are also subject to specific rules set forth in section 500.11[e].530 In 
1989 the Court of Appeals granted 78 of 99 motions for leave to file 
an amicus brief.531 
During 1990 Survey year, some decisions and other items of in- 
terest emerged that merit mentioning. 
A. Opting Out of Class Actions 
In Woodrow v. Colt Industries,532 the Court of Appeals consid- 
ered whether a Missouri corporation with no ties to New York had a 
due process constitutional right to opt out of a New York class action 
in which the relief sought was largely equitable in nature. The Court 
held that when a class action complaint demands predominantly equi- 
table relief that will necessarily benefit the class as a whole if granted, 
the trial judge is not required to give class members the opportunity 
526. Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1282. 
527. Id. at 1284. 
528. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
529. See Rule 500.1 1 [a], PI, [c] and [fl of the Court of Appeals Rules. 
530. Id., Rule 500.1 1 [ e ] Z  
531. See 1989 Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals (on file with 
Syracuse Law Review). 
532. 77 N.Y.2d 185, 566 N.E.2d 1160, 565 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1990). 
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to opt out of the 
B. Law School Dismissals 
Last year's Survey mentioned In re Susan "M9',534 where the Ap- 
pellate Division for the First Department reversed a dismissal of peti- 
tioner's Article 78 proceeding on the grounds that law schools owe 
students some kinds of safeguard against the possibility of arbitrary or 
capricious error in grading exams before expelling students for aca- 
demic deficiency. During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals ruled 
unanimously not to add grading law school exams to its functions.535 
Judge Alexander, speaking for the Court, held that a professor's eval- 
uation of a law student's performance is beyond the scope of judicial 
review unless the challenged determination was arbitrary and capri- 
cious, irrational and made in bad faith, or contrary to constitution or 
C Arbitration Clauses 
In Cowen & Co. v. Anderson,537 the Court of Appeals ruled that a 
standard arbitration clause in an agreement between Cowen & Co. 
and an investor allowed the investor to take his complaint to the 
American Arbitration Asso~ia t ion .~~~ 
D. Legal Malpractice Claims 
In Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe,539 the Court of 
Appeals held that a law £irm may not offset any malpractice award to 
its former client by the amount it would have received as a contin- 
gency fee for the personal injury action.540 Judge Kaye, who con- 
curred in the 4 to 3 decision, limited the holding to four essential 
facts541 and thus left open the possibility that under different circum- 
stances an offset would be proper.542 
533. Woodrow, 77 N.Y.2d at 195, 566 N.E.2d at 1165, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 760. 
534. 76 N.Y.2d 241, 556 N.E.2d 1104, 557 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1990). 
535. Susan "M", 76 N.Y.2d at 243, 556 N.E.2d at 1105, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 298. 
536. Id. at 246, 556 N.E.2d at 1107, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 300. 
537. 76 N.Y.2d 318, 558 N.E.2d 27, 559 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1990). 
538. Cowen & Co., 76 N.Y.2d at 322, 558 N.E.2d at 29, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 227. 
539. 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 61 1, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990). 
540. Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 39, 555 N.E.2d at 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 239. 
541. Id. at 45, 555 N.E.2d at 615, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243. 
542. Id. at 46-47, 555 N.E.2d at 616, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 244. 
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E. Emotional Distress: First Appellate Ruling on Injury 
In Lavanant v. General Accident Insurance Company of 
America,543 the Appellate Division for the First Department unani- 
mously ruled that where an insurance policy defines bodily injury as 
including sickness or disease, the scope of coverage includes the emo- 
tional and psychological effects of traumatic incidents covered by the 
policy. Justice Sullivan, writing for the court, referred to cases from 
other jurisdictions and stated that the First Department agreed with 
the conclusions of those courts that expanded the scope of bodily in- 
jury beyond physical harm.544 
E Contingency Fees 
In Beatie v. Del0ng,5~~ the Appellate Division for the First De- 
partment held that an attorney's contingency fee based on a percent- 
age of revenues generated by patents that the attorney recovered for 
his client was not impr0per.54~ 
G. Claims by Terminated Law Firm Partners 
A law firm partner who refused to change his "nine-to-five lifes- 
tyle" to conform with the rigorous demands of his firm had his claims 
summarily dismissed on the grounds that he would be unable to prove 
that he was wrongfully terminated from the firm.547 Also, terminated 
law firm partners who seek damages under ERISA and RICO claims 
can expect to have a summary judgment motion granted against 
them."* 
H. Law School Enrollments and Bar Examinations 
Despite a weak economy, law school applications and enroll- 
ments continue to increase.549 Also, of the record 7,285 candidates 
who took the July 24-25, 1990 state bar examination, 5,099 - or 70 
percent - passed the exam. The 70 percent pass rate is touted as a 
543. 164 A.D.2d 73, 561 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1st Dep't 1990). 
544. Lavanant, 164 A.D. at 79-80, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
545. 164 A.D.2d 104, 561 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1st Dep't 1990). 
546. Beatie, 164 A.D.2d at 109, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 451. 
547. See Reid v. Bickel, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16451 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
548. Clapp v. Greene, 743 F. Supp. 273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
549. Adams, Local Law Schools Recent Rke in Applications, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 
1990, at 1, col. 3. 
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record high.550 
I.  Small Claims Court Not Bound by Formal Procedure 
In Rahman v. Elite Car & Limo Ser~ice,5~1 the Civil Court of 
New York denied defendant's summary judgment motion and held 
that section1804 of the Civil Court Act gave the Small Claims Court 
great latitude to ignore procedural law in order to do substantial jus- 
tice between the parties. 
J.  Special Masters 
For many years the New York County Bar Association has se- 
lected voluntary special masters to assist Supreme Court judges in 
Manhattan. In Schwartz v. Stecher Jaglom & Prutzman'552 plaintiff 
moved to disqualify defendant's counsel because a member of his firm 
served as a special master in Supreme Court.553 Plaintiff claimed a 
conflict of interest existed that should have been disclosed.554 Justice 
Baer found that special masters did not determine cases but were lim- 
ited to discovery disputes and recommendations which the courts 
were not bound to follow.555 Justice Baer stated that the special mas- 
ters provide able help to a vastly overburdened Court and reminded 
the bench and bar that "[m]embership in the bar is not supposed to be 
simply a means to acquire wealth; it is also about service to the public 
good and the fair administration of justice."556 
We are again grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions 
from our colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I am par- 
ticularly thankful to the 1991 graduating classes of the Pace Univer- 
sity School of Law and the Fordham University School of Law for 
keeping me ever alert to new developments in New York Civil 
Practice. 
550. Record 70% Pass State Bar Examination, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1990, at 1 ,  co1.6. 
551. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1990, at 20, col. 5. 
552. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1990, at 22, col. 1 .  
553. I d  
554. Id. 
555. Id. 
556. I d  
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